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A MODEL OF CRIMINAL DISPOSITIONS:
AN ALTERNATIVE TO OFFICIAL DISCRETION
IN SENTENCING
LARRY

I.

PALMER*

Professor Palmer proposes a new model of criminal dispositions
which would replace official discretion at sentencing with judicially
created standards for sentencing officials. In Part I he outlines the
role of the appellate judiciary in developing an interest analysis
to enunciate standards to guide criminal dispositions. In Parts II
and III he examines the roles of administrative agencies and legislatures in perfecting the dispositional process under standards initially ari.iculated by the judiciary. Professor Palmer emphasizes the
concept of individual liberty as a central value of society and shows
how a new system of criminal dispositions can enhance that value
as a goal of the criminal law.
·
INTRODUCTION

A man shouting "holdup" may set in motion the machinery of state
intervention through the criminal process, leading to the conviction and
detention of the robber. Appellate courts then may be asked to rf?olve
a host of legal issues dealing with events occurring before and after
the shout to determine whether continued state control over the· ropber
is legitimate. For instance, an appellate court may decide that a hearing
is needed to determine the admissibility of the victim's sworn testimony
• Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University-Camden; A.B., 1966, Harvard College; LL.B., 1969, Yale University.
Part of the research done in conjunction with this article was supported by a grant
from the State Law Enforcement Planning Agency of the State of New Jersey. The
opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the
opinions or conclusions of the State Law Enforcement Planning Agency.
I would also h"ke to acknowledge the aid o£ my colleague, Professor Roger Clark,
who was kind enough to read a draft of this paper, and Professor Franklin Zimring for
his useful comments on portions of the paper. However, any errors are the responsibility
of the author.
[ 1J
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that the convicted robber was the man who held him up1 and might
explore such factors as the lighting at the scene of the holdup or the
nature of any police line-up.2 More frequently, in modern American
criminal law, appellate courts will be asked to determine the legality <:>f
po1ice investigative practices in the particular case. Did the police arrive soon enough after the shout to be ·in ·hot pursuit? Was the search
of the entire house proper under the circumst~nces? Was the seizure of
itern,!!_.of the robber's clothing as well as weapons supposedly used in
the holdup proper? If the seizure of the iterp.s was improper according
to some legal standard, the ultimate question· on appeal will be whether
the items should have been admitte.d at trial 3:nd whether the conviction
·
may stand.3
While the articulated goal of .the appellate review described above
might be t}J.e protection of some notion of individualliberty,4 ironicallyt
none of the corirts reviewing the trial judge's many decisions were concerned that our robber, who was convicted of armed robbery, was sentenced to ~ 4: ,years in prison. Nor did· the fact that other judges in the
same jurisdic?c;m might have sentenced him to five or 20 years raise a
legaLissue for appellate. court resolutipn~5 Assuming that the 14 year
sentence is appropriate, a prison official could initiate, without appellate
review, a· psychiatric examination process leading to indefinite confinement' of o'ur robber in a special institution for _treatment.
·
A simple explanation of this state of· affalrs in American criminal law
is that, despite the urging of many commentators,6 sentencing is not
generally subject to appellate review. Glven the close judicial scrutiny
of pretrial events and of the trial itself, some explanation of the prevailing practice of unreviewability of sentencing and other post-conviction
matters is in order. If the seizure of the robber's clothing by the police
pr(!Sel).ts a reviewable issue, so should the decision to imprison him for
'

.

'

-,

lSee <;;Uberty. Califoplia, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218,227 (1967).
2 See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196-99 (1972).
• 3 See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300 (1967).
4Jd. 'at 312 (Fortas, J., concurring). "I fear that in gratuitously striking down the
'mere evidence' rule, which distinguished members of this Court have acknowledged
as essential to eriforce the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against general searches, the
Court ne~dlessly deSt:roys, root and branch, a basic pai:1: .of liberty's heritage." ld.
5 See generally Coburn, Disparity in Sentences fl'Tld Appellate Review of Sentencing, 25"
RUTGERS L. REv. 207 (1971); Levin, Urban Politics and judicial Behavior, 1 J. LEGAL
STUDIES.193_ ·(1972) •.
6 See. generally ABA PROJECT ON MINIMuM STANDAlu>s FOR CRIMINAL JuSTICE, STANDARDs
RELATING 'To APPELLATE REviEw OF SENTENCES, ·Appendix D, 158-60 (Approved Draft,
1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDs]; Frankel, Lawlesmess in Sentencing, 41 U.
CIN. L. REv. I, 26 (1972).
'

.14 years rather than pl~ce him on probation.7 Sirnila.t:Jy, de.cisjons, ~on

his

cerning our robber's parole or.
transfer to a special treatment fa~ility
should be subject to judicial review. The degree of inattent~on. t? our
robber's post-conviction treatment has led one commentator to char:acterize the prevailing practice as "lawlessness in sentencing." 8
The prevailing practices exist in part because of the legal system~s
willingness to tolerate a coexistence of free agents and legally bound
agents. The police and, to a d~gree, the trial judge legally are bou,nd to
follow rules in their treatment of our robber. In contrast, the oflicials
involved in post-conviction decision making virtually are unrestricted
by legal rules in their dealings with our robber. This dichotomy is a reflection of the conflicting goals that .our legal system pursues. We
acknowledge that the criminal should be subject to social ·c-ontrol since
he held up the victim, but we· also are concerned that we ·protect his
individual rights, particularJy before labelling him a "cr~al." As a
result the legally bound ageo.ts are required to follow n~rowly prescribed rules in dealing with the robber in order to protect him,· but the
free agents are allowed broad (ijscretion .to insure that he gets th~ punishment he deserves.
.
· : . ··
·
. Thus, the trial judge is given broad discretion to sentenc;e and to "individualize" or tailor punishment to :fit our robber. An argument.to justify this discretion is that the individualization of punishment· through the
creation of free agents best achieves the dual goals of "reformation and
rehabilitation." 9 If the sentence is ill-suited to the individual defendant,
the trial judge always is subject to reversal for abuse of disctetion;10 but,
7Th~ maximum term of linpriso!!ffi~nt ·for arn:ted robb~ry .in ..M:;eyl;m,d i~ .20 y~ars.
Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27,

§ 488 (1957'). The judge' is authorized to nnpose probation deSpite
the fact that a niinlinum three yl';ar term is applicable to the general robbery statnte;
See id. §§ 486, 643. More than one-half of all persons under state crllninal control are
placed under supervised release in the. community rather than incarcerated. See THE
Pl!EsmENT's CoMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JuSTICE, TAsK
FoRCE REPoRT: CoRRECTioNs 27 (1967). See tflso R. CARm & L. WILKINs, PROJ34TION ANI>
PAROLE 18 (1970).
'
BSee FRANKEL, supra note 6, at 26; cf. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JusnCE,127;41. (.1_969).
But see H. PACKER, THE LIMITS oF THE CroMINAL SANCTION 139-45 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as H. PACKER].
. '
· "
.. .'
." · ·
9See Williams v. New York, 3~7 U.S. 241; 247-50 (1949).
·: "
10 Se~. Leach v. United States, 353 F.2d 451, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United. States. :v.
Wiley, 278 F.2d 500,503 (7th Cir.'l960). The trial court's use during sentendilg-bfinaccurate information regarding the d!';fendant's prior crlininal record' has long been held
a violation o£ due process •of law: ·See Townsend v. Burke, 33,4 U.S: 736; 740-41 {1948).
The scope of the attack on the process of sentencing can be e;,:panded to'require·ll code
of sentencing pro.cedure. Cf. Mempa .v•. Rh;1y, 389 U.S. 128, 135-36 (1967).; C.ohen; &n;.
tencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View From Mempa v..rRhay,-47
TEXAS L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1968h Pugli &·Carver,·Due Process and Senteni;i,ng: Fr()J1j'Mapp
to. -Me1~pa to McGaut[Ja,- 49' TEXAs· L. REv.· 25 (1970).·
·
,. • , · · . · ·~ : · •·
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in 'Order to maintain the free agency system, such instances of appellate
court intervention should be extremely rare. Belief in the efficacy of
trial judge discretion in sentencing logically leads to the creation of other
free agents. Thus, correction officials are given broad discretion in their
application of penal policies to our robber, and legal doctrines have developed effecting judicial reluctance to influence or modify the actions
of prison and parole officials.U A further argument in support of nonreviewability is that the adoption of any particular penal policy to control the free agents in their dealing with our robber simply is not a judicial function but rather that specific policies to guide correction officials
or judges should be formulated by the legislature.1z The result of the
prevailing practice, however, is that our robber probably will be treated
haphazardly by the various free agents.
While we close the curtain on our robber and leave him in the intra~
duction, the events occurring after his conviction are the focus of the
pages that follow. The position taken is that his post-conviction treatment must be the subject of legal review ~y the appellate courts. Our
robber justifiably is subjected to society's control, but that does not require the uncontrolled use of free agents pending legislative action.
FUr-thermore, the convicted individual is not truly protected by the
practice of "individualized" punishment which only obscures the real
issues of post-conviction treatment. The entire legal method developed
from the doctrine of trial judge discretion needs to be replaced with a
new mode of analysis compatible with modem notions of the goals of
the criminal law.
,- The alternative proposed is a method of legal analysis called "A Model
of Criminal Dispositions" and is grounded on the belief that the legitimacy of post-conviction treatment demands that sentencing officials be
governed by legal standards. The model is based upon three assumptions
about modern American criminal law. First, trial judge sentencing is essentially part of a broader category of legal decisions which may be
termed "dispositions." The feature common to all dispositions is that an
official is authorized by the legal system to exercise direct control 'Over
individuals. The model will focus on the broad category of criminal dispositions, with a preference for minimizing the use of such controls.13
11 See Note, Beyond the Ken uf the Courts: A Critique uf Judicial Refusal to Review
the Complaints of Ccmvicts, 72 YALEL.J. 506 (1963).
lZ See People v. Moore, 53 Cal. 2d 451, 348 P.2d 584, 2 Cal. Rptr. 6, cert. denied, 364
U.S. 895 (1960); Mack v. State, 203 Ind. 355, 180 N.E. 279 (1932). But see People v.
Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972); State v. Laws, 51 N.J. 494, 242 A.2d
333 (1968).
13 The term "dispositions" is broader than "sentencing" since individuals are deprived
of their liberty by some "civil" processes. See notes 186-224 infra and accompanying text.
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Second, since dispositions will be assumed to serve a· different fur~ction
from the adjudication of criminality, the same legal standards may not
be useful for both; indeed as will be seen, different legal standards shquld
govern the two types of decisions. Third, decisions concerning adjudica~on and disposition should be connected by overall goals or interests
promoted by the criminal law. A subsidiary of this third assumption is
that the judiciary is the appropriate agency to articulate these interests
iJ;l. the area of dispositions as it already does through review of adjudications. This will require the courts to engage in an "interest analysis" 14
by looking to the legislative policy behind the delineation of criminal
oft:enses as well as the policies underlying the court-developed constitutional limitations on criminal adjudication. Mter the appellate courts
have developed this basic analysis for rule making in the area of dispositions, the goal of judicial intervention in the correctional process should
be the development of standards of judicial review of what are, in effect,
criminal administrative agencies. 15
The rules of disposition developed under the model are applicable to
some of the unresolved problems of "sentencing." Within the area of
o;-ial judge sentencing, the model offers standards and accompanying
policies to govern the decision to grant probation, the use of prior convictions, the imposition of multiple sentences, and the effect of an individual's non-cooperation. These rules of decision making for appellate
and trial judge sentencing will be developed in Part I. Once the individual is within the state confinement process, there are at least two areas
-the administration of intra-prison discipline and parole determinations
-where the model suggests standards which would protect individuals
from improper exercise of administrative discretion. Part II will demonstrate how the judiciary and correction officials should share this decision
making responsibility.
·By legislative directive the purpose of some of the state confinement
processes may be articulated specifically as "non-criminal." Under ~he
analysis proposed, however, the commitment of any individual by legal
process involves a disposition. The analysis proposes some rules that
would protect individuals within these specialized processes, regardless
of the legislatively articulated goal of disposition. The Federal Youth
Corrections Act, indeterminate sentencing schemes for women, a "family
offense" statute, and several civil commitment processes are examined
in light of the model's broad goal of minimizing the use of coercive legal
As the criminal law is but one form of social and legal control, less coercive methods
.should be employed whenever possible.
14 See notes 31-35 infra and accompanying text.
i5 See notes 157-185 infra and accompanying text.
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power to control' individuals. Part Til thus offers an opportunity to ob.:.
serve.-the appellate judiciary in its suggested role as catalyst for reform.
Within the three broad assumptions developed above concerning the
criminal law, the model essentially is an attempt to relate the disposition
of the individual case and the interests which the criminal law is designed
to promote. The model recognizes that courts, legislatures, and criminal
administrative agencies make dispositional decisions from their particular
institutional perspective. Underlying the legal standards proposed, however, is an assumption that all decision makers should acknowledge the
disutility of criminal dispositions for all individuals whose conduct ordinarily would lead to an adjudication of "criminality." 16 Part IV will
conclude with a discussion of issues left unresolved by the article but
which are capable of resolution under the analysis proposed.
'
PART I
QuESTIONs oF jUDICIAL DisPosiTIONAL PoLICY
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR DISPOSITIONS
At a time when official discretion in dispositions is the rule and modifications are proposed, a constitutional framework for dispositions performs two important functions. An appellate court restricted by constitutional doctrine constantly must confront the question of the limits
of its institutional role in modifying present sentencing practices. Furthermore, such a framework will reemphasize the important function of
the appellate court in questioning "inferior" decision malcers, a role
which the Supreme Court undertook in the recent death penalty case
of Furman v. GeorgiaP The eighth amendment, which addresses itself
directly to the issue of limitations on dispositions, 18 and the fourteenth
amendment provide the framework for determining the limitations on
the legal system in its post-conviction treatment of individuals.19
16 Professor Hart defines criminality as that conduct which, if duly shown tO havt::
taken place, will irtcur a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation
of the community. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW AND CoNTEMP, Pnon.

401,416 (1958) •.
17 408..U.S. 238 (1972): The nine divergent opinions in Furman reflect the difficulty
the Court: had in imposing a constitutional analysis on an area theretofore guided principally by discretion; the failure of the decisions to articulate more specific limitations
on dispositions, therefore, should not be surprising.
_ 18 T~e eighth amendment provides as follows: "Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and uousual punishments inflicted." U.S. CaNST.
amend:VIII.'
·
·
19 The thirteenth amendment may also provide broad principle of. limitation. "Neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted shall exist within the United States, or any place subject

a
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One possible analysis of the \~igh~h am~ndment is a determination of
what the Fo11nding Fathers deemed ~n appropriate mode .of disposition
upon conviction.20 Under such, an historical analysis, corp 0.ral punishto their jurisdiction." [d. amend. ·XIII, § 1. While sentencing or disposition may have been
from the minds of the Framers, the "duly convicted" language could be given a· new
interpretation and become an important source of principles in view of modern notions
of what constitutes legitimate exercise of state power over individuals.· Justice ;B~ennan
of the Michigan Supreme Court has indicated his belief that the thirteenth ~endment
limits judicial discretion. See People v. Payne, 386 Mich. 84, 98, 191 N.W.2d 375, '382 (1971)
(Brennan, J., dissenting), rev'd on other grounds, 41 U.SL.W. 4671 (U.S. May 21, 1973).
In the course of his separate opinion Justice Brennan stated:
I believe, however, that the United States Supreme Court was very, very
wrong-dangerously, and illiberally wrong-in concluding th{!t a harsher.
penalty could be imposed upon a defendant f.or ' ... conduct ... ocelli-ring · ·
after .•. the original sentencing ....'
.
CoUrtS are empowered to mete out sentences for the conduct of which ·the
defendant stands convicted. That conduct, and only that conduct, ha~ been
established factually in the manner required by constitutional due process.
Any other, subsequent, conduct with which the defendant has not been
duly charged and of which he had not been duly convicted according to
the Constitution and laws of the State and the Nation simply cmmot be made
the basis for depriving a person of his liberty.
The Thirteenth Amendment makes the point perfectly and abundantly
clear.
Id. at 98, 191 N.W.2d at 382. But see Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 369-72 (WD.
Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304, 306. (8th Cir. 1971) (claim by state prisoners that thirteenth amendment limited correction official's discretion rejected).
At a minimum, the thirteenth amendment might be used by a court to support its
claim o£ the institutional capacity to promulgate rules, of constitutional and non-constitutional dimension, concerning dispositions.
20 The history of punishment in this country during colonial times discloses an atti.:
tude towards those who deviate from society's norms which still persists today. Prior
to the adoption of any constitutional. limitation on dispositions; the sanctions infticted,
upon the deviant were designed to achieve a perceived social purpose. · Dur.ing the
colonial period, the deviant or offender was viewed primarily as a sinner. To the Puritan
mind, crime. an~ sin were synonymous. The frequent use of sanctiqns that IPade the
offender-sinner a participant in the "punitive process" can be explained ·jl,l terms of ~
desire to reform the offender-sinner. See G. HASKINs, LAW AND Aumorurr.. IN EARLY
MASsACHUSETTS 206 (1968). It was thought that sanctions that worked directly on the
individual's conscience were most· effective. While some. forms of devian.c.e ·might require ouster -from the community, banishment was utilized primarily for religious 'hereti~
whose consc_iences could not be reformed. The legally authorized ·dispositions:fQr .pon.:.
capital offenses, primarily corporal punishment and a system of fines, 'vere design(fd for
an identifiable group .that was vjewed as capable of sufficient reform to" r~t)ll'Il to· the
•
society.Id.
During the revolutionary era, soCiety's attitude about. the function of the cr.iminal law
changed. While formerly the criminal law was viewed as a means of preserving religious
morality, its puipose grew to include the protection of property on non-religious grounds.
With the development of different attitudes towards crime, the legal system increasingly,
treated the offender as an outcast of society. Newer forms of dispositions'"gradually: developed to replace the two revolutionary dispositions-corporal punishment and. rlib11e'tao/ fines. Imprisonment at hard labor became the basic form· of disposition· fQchon-:

8
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ment, although not now widely used, may be viewed as permissible under
the eighth amendment if legislatively authorized.21 The constitutional
amendment, therefore, performs its proper function by exercising a restraining influence upon the legislature which authorizes dispositions. 22
An alternative analysis of the eighth amendment gives it a modern
function in light of the two themes in the history of American punishment. Under this analysis, for example, a legislatively authorized death
penalty would be impermissible even though death, like corporal punishment, was utilized widely as the disposition for convictions of certain
crimes at the time of the Founding Fathers. The "in light of contemporary human knowledge" 23 and "the dignity of man" 24 standards
could be utilized by the judiciary to declare the legislatively authorized
penalty unconstitutional,25
A majority of the Justices could not agree upon any particular functional analysis of the eighth and fourteenth amendments in the recent
death penalty case.26 Nonetheless, recent prevailing opinions will have
two important effects upon decision making in the area of dispositions.
They establish that the judiciary has the institutional capacity to declare
a legislatively authorized disposition illegal.27 Furthermore, the per curiam
opinion of the Furman majority opens up a legal debate over dispositions
generally and the punishment of death in particular.28 That debate will
capital offenses by 1805. With state incarceration as the ultimate disposition, procedural
protections for the individual became more important as the infliction of incarceration
involved a process of the state versus the individual. Nelson, Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era: An Historical Perspective, 42 N.Y.UL.
REv. 450,451,458-66 (1967).
21 State v. Cannon, 55 Del. 587, 190 A.2d 514 (1963); accord, Foote v. Maryland, 59
Md. 264 (1883) (disposition of seven lashes as well as a short jail term upheld where
statute allowed trial judge to determine the number of lashes); Gracia v. New Mexico,
1 NM. 415 (1869) (disposition of 30 lashes for horse theft upheld).
22 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 397, 399-400, 403-04, 426, 429-30, 466~8 (1972)
(Burger, C.J., Powell, & Rehnquist, JJ ., dissenting).
23 Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
24 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
25People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 647, 493 P.2d 880, 893, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 164-65
(1972); see Goldberg & Dersh<>witz, Declaring the Death Penalty Uncunstitutional, 83
HARv. L. REv. 1773, 1777-98 (1970). But see Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime,
77 HARv. L. REv. 1071, 1073-74, 1078 (1964); Wheeler, Towards a Theory of Limited
Punishment After Furman v. Georgia (pt. IT), 25 STAN, L. REv. 62, 66 (1972).
26 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
27 See id. at 239-40; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664-67 (1962). Robimon was
only a substantive limitation on the promulgation of rules describing illegal conduct;
in the sense of this article, this is a limitation on the adjudicatory stage. See Goldberg &
Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV, L. REv. 1773, 1801
n.123 (1970). But see In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 378 P.2d 793, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1963).
28 The highest courts of Delaware and North Carolina recendy h~ve held that Fumum
requires that the "mercy statutes" permitting the jury or the trial judge not to impose
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involve a two-fold inquiry: (1) for crimes in general, what are the permissible dispositional policies and the permissible means of decision making to implement those policies;29 and (2) for what purposes and according to what standards can the administrators of dispositional processes change the terms and conditions of an individual's confinement? 5°
AN "INTEREST ANALYSIS" OF THE CRIMINAL LAW

An analysis of the particular interests the criminal law is intended ro
promote is the first step in the development of standards for disposition.
The four broad categories of interests or values of the society promoted
by the criminal law are security of the person's body, private property,
state processes, and a concept of individualliberty. 31
Whether the fourth interest, a concept of individual liberty, is or ought
to be a goal of the criminal law has sparked considerable debate.32 It is
given equal weight here since its conceptualization as a goal serves to
integrate the substance and process of modem criminal law. Judicially
the death penalty for capital offenses are invalid. These decisions impose a mandatory
death penalty scheme by judicial interpretation in both states. See State v. Dickerson,
- Del. - , - , 298 A.2d 761, 764, 768 (1972); State v. Talbert, - N.C. - , - , 194
S.E.2d 822, 826 (1973); State v. Wadell,- N.C.-,-, 194 S.E. 2d 19, 28-29 (1972).
29 See State v. Ward, 57 N.J. 75, 82-83, 270 A.2d 1, 5 (1970) (first offenders in marijuana possession cases should receive suspended sentences); Bonnie & Whitebread, The
Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal History of
American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REv. 971, 1138-39 (1970); notes 60-86 infra
and accompanying text; cf. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 248 (1971) (Brennan,
J., dissenting). See also In re Lynch, S Cal. 3d 410, 503 P .2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972);
People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972); People v. Sinclair, 387
Mich. 91, 134, 194 N.W.2d 878, 928 (1972) (Brennan, ]., concurring).
80 See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (infliction of whlpping by inmate-foreman under court ordered regulations and procedures held violative of eighth
amendment); In re Birdsong, 39 F. 599 (S.D. Ga. 1889) (court used attachment for contempt to prevent jailkeeper from disciplining detainee by chaining him to the grating
of his cell on a diet of bread and water because the jailkeeper lacked power to select
arbitrarily any punishment to discipline detainees). See generally Wheeler, Toward a
Theory of Limited Ptmislmzent: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN.
L. REv. 838 (1972); Note, Recent Applications of the Ban on Cruel and U7lUSUal Pwzishments: Judiciary-Enforcement Reform of Non-Federal Penal Imtitutiom, 23 HAsT. L.J.
lll1 (1972).
31 At least the first three proposed interests have been discussed elsewhere. See Kadish,
The Crisis of Over-Criminalization, 374 ANNALS 157 (1967).
·
32 See H. PACKER 14-16. Professor Packer recognizes that a concept of individual liberty
or autonomy ought to qualify the interest of the criminal law in crime prevention, but
he does nor place individual liberty on an "equal footing with the prevention of crime •..
the primary purpose of the criminal law." Id. at 14.
One of Packer's most outspoken antagonists suggests that individual autonomy or the
minimizing of state interference with an individual's life ought to be viewed as one of
the primary goals of criminal law. Griffith, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a Third
"Model'' of the Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359, 367 n.34, 374-75 (1970}. ·
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fashioned 'due process limitations are essentially new ways in which individuals within the criminal process can force the legal system to consider certain challenges to the legality of state control. 33 Prior to the
criminal law's "constitutionalization," the broad principle of legality was
the only doctrine which recognized these interests.34 The inclusion of
a concept of individual liberty as a factor of equal weight in the analysis
merely recognizes the need to articulate those characteristics or interests
of individuals that should be factors in criminal law decision making.
· This concept of individual liberty as an interest to be considered at
dispositions is not synonymous with freedom from governmental interference.35 As a factor of analysis at disposition, the concept of individual
liberty refers only to limitations on the state's interference with individuals adjudged "criminal" to the extent necessary to achieve the state's
qispositional goals. As an independent factor, the concept of individual
liberty is, in addition, a starting point for rules of disposition where the
g<?als. sought in the promulgation of certain laws and the adjudication
of cen~ conduct as criminal are in doubt.
FOUR AREAS OF APPELLATE COURT RULE MAKING FOR
TRIAL JUDGE SENTENCING

:With an interest analysis as· a to'ol for the development of rules of disposition, an appellate court is ready to assume its often advoc~ted role
as reviewer of trial judge l)entencing decisions. The rules developed
shoul~ be capable of justifying the differing treatment of individuals by
the legal system36 by refere:t;~.ce to.the dispositional goals of that system.87
Four problem areas of trial judge sentencing are ripe for appellate
~?~t resolution through primary rule making under the analysis proposed. !he decision to grant or deny probation in a given case should
be viewed and resolved by the appellate court as the question of incarceration versus non-incarceration. The proper use of prior convictions in
'f!,iaLjudge_ sentencing is badly in need of appellate court guidance. Ap:33 See H. PACKER 163-73.

HALL, GENE~ PruNCIP~ OF CruMINAL LAW 27-69 (2d cd. 1960); G. WILLIAMS,
LAw: THE GENERAL PART 575-608 (London ed. 1961).
'35 h~wever, the question is whethe~ th~ concept of liberty prohibits the state from
using· the criminal process, the concept of liberty appropriately might be defined as freedom from governmental interference. See Packer, The Aims of the Criminal Law Revisited: A Plea for a New Look at "Substantive Due Process", 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 490
(1971); cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169-70 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) •
. ?6 Cf. Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853,
86+65 (1963). '
· ai&e·Cobuni, Disparity in Sentences' and Appellate Review of Sentencing, 25 RutGERS
L. REv. 207, 208:09. (1971).
·'
34 ].
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pellate courts should develop rul~ fo! the disposition of individuals found
guilty of more than one offense,- since. legislative guidelines or standards
for dispositions in such cases have te'n~ed to ignore· the functioning of
the criminal law as a coherent process. Finally, appellate courts should
develop criteria ·to determine the proper effect of an individual's noncooperation with the processes ·of the. crimirial law. Once the primary
rules of dispositions are promulgated by the appellate court, the penal
policy appropriate to achieve the dispositional-goal can be formulated.

Incarceration v. Non-incarceration.

The grant or denial of probation, or· of any other permissible disposition not involving incarceration, and· the disparity of disposif!ons- between two individuals found
guilty of the same offense, particularly where one receives probation and
the other is incarcerated, have long been recognized as problems most in
need of the guidance of appellate court rules. On the assumption that
minimizing' governmental interferen;ce is qne of the goals sought in th~
development of rules for dispositions, indivipuals should be presumed to
prefer probation over incarceration. 38 The legal standards that govelJl
this primary decision justify why certain individuals are incarcerat~d
while others receive probation.
The shift from the prevailing analysis to· the proposed one as a means
of deciding who should be granted probation involves three steps. First,
the criteria suggested as a guide to. the trial judge's grant or denial of
probation must be tested against modern concepts of individual liberty.
The second step involves a determination of the proper scope of the appellate judiciary's policy making rol_e iri disposition, a role generally
ignored under the existing analysis. Finally, dispositional decisions should
be cast in terms of overall dispositional policy so that appellate opinions
in sentencing cases will contain principles of law, which can be used as
authority in deciding future cases by appellate and trial courts alike.
The recent codification movement in the United States has produced
some suggested criteria for trial judge sentencing in the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code. 39 rn.· addition to enacting a general presumption against incarceration, the Model Penal Code provides for 11
different types of factors that should b~ ~eighed by the trial judge in
as Some individuals convicted of crimes in fact may prefer incarceration, but their
reasons should be· considered pathological arid shoUld not affect the adoption of particular legal standards.
39 ALI MonEr. PENAL ·conE § 7.01 (1962);• see Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law
in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68 C<iLuM:. L. REv. 1425, 1450-=56 (1968);
Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 465
(1961).
. : ·'; ..
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Pis determination to grant or deny probation.40 Those recommended
criteria are a product of the prevailing analysis, and an examination of
one of the factors for sentencing demonstrates that the criteria probably
are unworkable as there is no overall framework for legal decision making included in the Code.
Section 7.01(2) (f) of the Model Penal Code provides that the judge
should consider whether the defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his crimes.41 This criterion is likely to be significant
if used by trial judges in cases involving the variety of crimes that
threaten private property. If willingness to reimburse assumes an ability
to reimburse, the inappropriateness of the criterion can be demonstrated
by comparing its effects upon two individuals. Assume that both individuals have been convicted of one of the offenses against private property and that one of them, A, is willing and able to reimburse the victim,
but the other, B, is willing but unable to reimburse the victim.
Without any other information about A or B, the use of section
7.01 (2)(f) as a standard probably increases B's risk of incarceration as
compared to A because of their respective economic situations. Viewing
E's crime as one against private property, his greater risk of incarceration
Code provides in pertinent parts:
(2) The f.ollowing grounds, while not controlling the discretion of the
Court, shall be accorded weight in favor of withholding sentence of imprisonment:
(a) the defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious harm;
(b) the defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would
cause or threaten serious harm;
{c) the defendant acted under a strong provocation;
(d) there were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant's criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense;
(e) the victim of the defendant's criminal conduct induced or facilitated
its commission;
(f) the defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his
criminal conduct for the damage or injury that he has sustained;
(g) the defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the
.commission of the present crime;
(h) the defendant's criminal conduct was the result of circumstances
unlikely to recur;
(i) the character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that he is unlikely to commit another crime;
(j) the defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment;
(k) the imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship
to himself or his dependents.
ALI MoDEL PENAL CoDE§ 7.01 (1962).
4.1 See id. § 7.01 (2} (f); note 40 supra.
40 The
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can be justified if the dispositional goal is to keep individuals with fewer
economic resources from taking from those with greater resources in an
unlawful manner. A is allowed to decrease his risk of incarceration by
reimbursement on the more general theory that offenses against private
property are concerned primarily with misappropriation of resources,
so that reallocation through reimbursement 'Of the victim by the offender
furthers .this broad interest sought by the criminal law through dispositional policy.
Equalizing the risk of incarceration of A and B by disallowing section
7.01 (2) (f) as a factor in trial judge sentencing could be justified by a
different theory of the goals behind laws that protect the interest in
private property. The proliferation of offenses in this category is in
response to a recognition by the criminal law that individuals in a society
originally built upon a concept of private wealth are tempted to allocate
the resources of others to themselves. 42 If this explanation is accurate,
the goal at disposition should be to promote among all individuals, regardless of their economic resources, the notion that there are illegitimate
means of utilizing the resources of others. When illegitimate means are
chosen, the society will intervene thr'Ough the criminal process against
the individual who is in effect an illegitimate entrepreneur.43
. Equalization of the risk of incarceration of A and B is the proper
aispositional policy in modern American criminal law. The law's policy
that an individual's economic status should not adversely affect the adjudication of his criminality must be viewed as within the concept of
individual liberty at disposition.44 Under this analysis, the appellate coun
would rule that the use of willingness to pay as a factor in the trial judge's
determination concerning probation is impermissible in offenses against
private property. The court's rationale would be that the use of the
standard violated the concept of individual liberty since its use increases
risk of incarceration on the basis of economic status. In a case involving
an individual in B's position, even without a person like A as a co-defendant, the court could make the ruling as a matter of dispositional
policy without having to determine what the proper criteria for granting
probation in the particular case should be.
· 42 The recognition of the traditional "claim o£ right" defense in most common law
crimes involving theft might be justified on this theory. Cf. Morissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246 (1952); Hart, supra note 16, at 431 n.70.
43 Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Iwliewbility: Orze
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1124-27 (1972).
44See Morgan v. Wolford, 472 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1973) (requirement of restitution
as a condition of probation justiciable on equal protection grounds); q. Tate v. Short,
399 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illjnois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
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Where appellate courts do rule that probation is to be granted, the
reasoning employed should.establish standards that are appropriate guides
for trial judge decisions in future cases and consistent with the appellate
court's broad rule making power. For example, sentencing decisions in
selective service cases at both the appellate and trial court levels raise
troublesome questions of the proper exercise of trial judge and appellate
court discretion in dispositional decisions.45
The reasoning in the recent case of United States v. Daniels4 6 demonStrates the need for principled decision making by appellate courts. The
defendant, a conscientious objector, failed to comply with an order of
his local board to report for instructions to commence his alternative
service. The appellate court previously had remanded the case for a nevv.
sentence upon affirming Daniels' conviction for violating the selective
service law. 47 Upon remand the district judge once again sentenced
Daniels to the five year maximum term. On the second appeal the court
relied upon what it viewed as Daniels' individual characteristics in entering a probation order in its mandate to the district judge.48
The appellate court's order, however, went beyond merely mandating
probation and the term of probation. Daniels was a Jehovah's Witness
who apparently was willing to comply with a judicial order to present
himself for civilian work but not an order from his selective service
board. The appellate court's order accommodated Daniels' individual
religious scruples against cooperating with the selective service system
by requiring him to perform civilian work determined by the probation
department.49
While the five year maximum sentence may have been excessive in
Daniels' case, the important question not addressed by the court was
whether any period of incarceration was appropriate for the offense. If
the interest protected by the substantive offense is the state processes,
particularly the process of selecting those individuals who must do combatant service, civilian service, or no service,S0 it is difficult to under~
stand why the court utilized its powers and resources to put Daniels
into the civilian service slot when another specialized state agency was
authorized to and had already done the same thing. Daniels' individual
45 See FRANKEL, supra note 6, at 108 n.32; cf. Note, Sentencing in Cases of Civil Disobedience, 68 CoLUM. L. REv. 1508 (1968).
46446 F.2d 967 (6th C'rr.1971).
47 United States v. Daniels, 429 F.2d J273 (6th. Cir. 1970).
,
.. 48446 F.2d at 972. Such action by the appellate court rather than remanding has been
characterized as unprecedented in commentaries on the case. See 23 CASE W. REs. L, REv.
430 (1972); 42 U. CrN. L. REv. 195 (1972):
49 446 F .2d at 972.
50 Cf. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
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religious beliefs had been considered when he was classified as a consci~ntious objector by the selective service board. The legislatively-prescribed duty for a conscientious objector was to perform civilian work
.as ordered by the local board, and failure to comply with that order
results in criminal liability. The apparent explanation for the court's
.action was that Daniels' religious beliefs justified this highly individual.:
ized treatment. Such an explanation ignores the difficult type of fact
:finding trial judges might be encouraged to make if religious belief is
to be a factor for distinguishing the disposition of ip.dividuals.51
The appellate court stated that Daniels' sole motivation for refusing
to obey the order was his religious belief,52 but the court failed to consider whether individual motivation is a relevant criterion to guide the
primary stage of disposition-the decision concerning incarceration-or
whether motivation for disobeying the order is relevant in adjudicating
the criminality of Daniels' conduct. If religious motivation is the controlling factual element, the individual whose motivation is found by the
sentencing judge to be simple contrariness could be sentenced to .five
years.
Furthermore, while the total -legal system protects the individual's
religious beliefs under the .first amendment, serious questions arise as to
the proper function of criminal law and the fairness of its administration
when religious beliefs are us~d to justify what otherwise would be viewed
criminal conduct. It is no defense to a charge of bigamy, for instance,
that the individual's religion permits or promotes polygamy. 53 Whenever the law attempts to exempt certain individuals from the criminal
law, as in the case of peyote use by certain American Indian religion~
~ects, the question arises as to why newer "religious" groups cannot
daim the exemption from criminal sanctions for use of different drugs
for allegedly religious purposes. 54
·
_·
If violation of the order of a local selective service board is viewed
as a crime against state processes, the proper issue in Daniels is whethe~
~~e sole .objective in. having suclJ. a crime is to encourage individuals in
general to cooperate with a state regulatory process of fairly selecting
mdividuals for state qpligatiqns. Assuming that .protection of the $ystem
of selection is the proper .legislative goal in defining the conduct ~

as

· 51 Whether the legislature sho.Jlld consider broadening th~ category of inquiry into an
individual's belief is a separate question. Cf. Goldstein, Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence,

77 YALE L. J. 1053, 1068-69 (1968).
'52#6 F.2d at 968:'
·
'
53 See

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).

54See generally Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851· (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other
grouruls, .395 U.S: 6 ·(1969); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. id 716! 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. REfr·
<69 (1964).
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criminal,55 the issue is whether that goal can be furthered at disposition
by the imposition of some period of incarceration. Without deciding
whether the maximum penalty was excessive by some appropriate principle,56 the decision concerning incarceration should not turn solely on
what the court views as an individual's religious principles. To be fair
to the individual who violates the law without religious motivations or
any other apparent motivation, the legal system should minimize its inquiry into religious beliefs.57
The technique applied by the Daniels court of categorizing the individual ·offenders to arrive at broad dispositional policy is a practical result of the prevailing analysis' stated goal of individualizing sentencing
decisions. 58 Such an analysis, however, will not bring about the desired
result of principled decision making in sentencing. An appellate court
using such an analysis has decided that gambling offenders ordinarily
should be incarcerated,59 but that first time offenders convicted of possession of marijuana should receive probation. 60 The court was able to
reach the latter result without any explicit consideration of its previous
holding as to gambling offenses or any attempt to reconcile the results
in terms of overall dispositional policy. 61
66

Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377-80 (1968).

Note, supra note 45, at 1511-14.
Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 446-47 (1969); note 51 supra.
68 A recent study of the appellate process of sentencing in England indicates that the
growing acceptance of individualization of disposition did not mean the end of sentences
of incarceration. The framework of sentencing policy developed by the English Appellate Court of Criminal Appeal allows two primary modes of disposition-individualization or incarceration. Under this analysis individualization includes dispositions which
include confinement in state institutions either f.or training or preventive custody of
certain supposedly identifiable groups of individuals. The analysis demonstrates that
there are four types of individuals for whom individualized dispositions are appropriate:
young offenders, indetenninate recidivists, inadequate recidivists, and mentally disordered
offenders.
This notion of individualization assumes that the goal of the legal system in these
cases is treatment or reformation of individuals so disposed. D. THoMAs, PRINCIPLES oF
SENTENCING 3-31 (1970). However, when the goal of disposition is non-criminal, the
practice in the United States has been to use "civil" commitment procedures. These dispositional processes must include principles that protect individuals from confinement.
These civil dispositional processes have been affected in the United States by the due
process revolution. See notes 186-225 infra and accompanying text.
59 State v. Ivan, 33 N.J. 197, 162 A.2d 851 (1960).
so State v. Ward, 57 N.J. 75, 270 A.2d 1 (1970); see [1966] New Jersey Laws ch. 313,
§ 24: 18-47 (c) (1) (1966).
61 The court in State v. Ward did state, however, that it considered its determination
to suspend sentences to be consistent with a legislative policy of leniency toward first
offenders. See 57 N.J. at 82-83, 270 A.2d at 5-6.
56 See

67 See

1973]

SENTENCING

17

Under the proposed model, any distinction between the dispositional
policies for gambling and drug offenses 62 in terms of the four broad interests promoted by the criminal law63 would be inappropriate. Both
offenses are "vice crimes" and should be analysed in terms of the fourth
interest of a concept of individual liberty, since neither of the Qffenses
fits within the first three interests. To develop a policy of disposition in
terms of a concept of liberty is to define the meaning of "individuality"
for the purpose of legal decision making. Such a definition begins with
a comparison of the various attitudes towards the offending conduct.64
Drug users and gamblers probably would define individual liberty to
mean freedom from governmental interference. 55 From their perspective,
the criminal law should not be employed to regulate the specific conduct
in question. The proposed analysis, however, cannot ignore the effect
on non-gamblers and non-drug users of having criminal laws prohibiting
the conduct. Assuming the latter groups are in the majority, the use of
the criminal law to prohibit the conduct could be viewed as beneficial
to the society's concept of individual liberty. A particular notion of individual physical and mental health-that the free man is unshackled by
the vices of gambling or drugs-is promoted by discouraging the conduct. If drug users or gamblers are becoming at least a substantial minority, then a wide divergence of views as to the meaning of individuality exists within the society.66
The majority is presumed to share with the minority a desire to be
free from unnecessary governmental interference. The use of the law's
most coercive form Qf social control, however, allows the majority to
use the criminal law and its disposition to impose its view of individuality
on a substantial minority. None of the other three social int~rests sought
through the criminal law-security of the body, private property and
state processes-is at stake. Thus an appellate court could conclude that
the promulgation of the prohibition and the adjudication of the conduct
62 The discussion will concern only the criminal offense concerning marijuana. Other
types o£ drugs such as heroin present other dispositional problems. Cf. In re De La 0,
59 Cal. 2d 128, 378 P.2d 793, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1963) (challenge to civil commitment of
individuals addicted to heroin).
63 See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
64 The use of such a comparison to develop a legal mle is a form of utilitarian analysis.
See Packer, supra note 35, at 496.
65See generally State v. Kantner, Hawaii-, 493 P. 2d 306 (1972); Bonnie &
Whitebread, supra note 29; Packer, supra note 35.
66 The present analysis does not decide whether the legal system could establish a
system of control or regulation over certain types of drugs and gambling. Nor does
the present legal analysis require a decision as to what forms of taxation on the use
of drugs and gambling may be legally permissible were drugs and gambling to be decriminalized. Cf. H. PACKER 332-42.
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as crimin~l probably have an adverse effect upon the .society's concept
of individual liberty and that incarceration therefore is inappropriate. 67
The appellate court rule requiring that probation -ordinarily should be
imposed in both gambling and drug offenses is established in the interest
of minimizing governmental interference with individuals. 68 The rule
is furthermore a frank acknowledgment by the judiciary that the utility
Of the criminal law as means of regulating these forms of conduct is in
doubt. As a more generalized principle of disposition, the standard should
be that when~ the social control goal is in doubt under the interest analysis, decision making is weighted in favor of promoting a concept of
individual liberty.
Yet the trial judges specifically were instructed by the appellate court
to impo~e custodial sentences in gambling offenses. 69 The New Jersey
Supreme Court went even further in the interest of minimizing disparity
and instructed that a single judge in each district should sentence gambling offenders.70 The justification for imposing custodial dispositions
for a bookmaking offense was that the goal was to cope effectively with
organized crime. As -one court stated, " [w] hen the offense serves the
interests of a widespread conspiracy, it would be a mistake to think of
the defendant as an isolated figure." 71 Even if the appellate court is
strongly of the persuasion that organized crime exists, the result of the
court's dispositional rule is to allow the sentencing judge to engage in
impermissible adjudication. At sentencing the trial judge is allo\~ed to
treat ·the individual as if the legal system in fact had adjudicated him
guilty of a conspiracy-a group crime. In fact, in the case where the
court established the rule of custodial offenses, everything that the sentencing judge knew about the defendant's criminal activity came from
a· pre-sentence report since the defendant had been allowed to plea no
contest or non vult.72 One implicit purpose of the rule is· to reflect in. the
defendant's· sentence criminal activity of others.73 To justify the .dis.- 67 See gener:ally_ H. HART, LAw, LmERTY ANn Mo~LITY (1963) •
.". 68While ~~ction 7.01(b)(l) of the Model Penal Code suggests that whether conduct
~aused serious harm. is relevant to the decision not to incarceJ;ate, the present interest
analysis arrives at the same result by determining that the social goal to be promoted
by criminalization is questionable. The concept of individual liberty is considered to
determine. the degree o£ "harm." ..
69 See note 59 sdpra and accompanying teXt.
70 See State V.~De Stasio, 49 N.J.-247, 25'4-55, 229 A.2d·636, 640 (1967).
71 State v. Ivan, 33 N.J. 197, 202, 162 A.2d 851, 854 (196,0).
7ZSee id; at'198, 162 A.2d at 852. Whether individuals should be required to plead not
guilty s-6 .that the legal system would have in all cases of disposition some type of
adjudiCation or· fact finding proceSs· raises a host of other legal issues.. Cf. United States
v. JackSon, 390 U.S •. 570 (1968).
.
·· .
·
·
73 See State v. De Stasio, 49 N.J. 247, 254-55,229 A.2d 63(), 640 (1967).•.
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positional policy· on the grounds that the custodial sentence will force
individual defendants to come forward with information about their
supposed superiors raises a further issue of whether the mdividual right
of non-cooperation has been infringed.74
· Perhaps the functional mistake in the court's analysis is the use of rul~
of disposition to achieve the investigative goals of other state officials.
When the argument was made to the court that the custodial se~tence
was not necessary "because the public wants to gamble," 75 ~he court
could have developed a dispositional policy in accorda:n~~ with an .interest analysis so that individuals need not suffer incar~eration for providing a gambling service that members of the public apparently desire.
If gambling is a criminal offense because "it wrecks homes ~nd destroys
men" and because it "spawns embezzlement, larceny and crimes of vio:lence," 76 the question remains why the legislature in the state has legalized gambling in some instances.77 The existence of a vice crime in fact
may increase the power of the syndicate,78 and the actual total impact
upon the legal system can be viewed as another disutility of the offense.
While investigation of criminal activity is a legitimate state function in
criminal law, the use of the dispositional rule to achieve ,tpis p':Jrpose is
at the very least questionable.
·
In selecting a dispositional policy for the first time marijuana offender,
the court rightly refused to tallow what the interest a,nalysi~ suggests
is a wrongly decided precedent in the gambling case, but ~i'd, so without
explanation. Rather, the court distinguished the cases, but the distinctions did not justify the difference in dispositions employed. Since the
actual defendant in the case had admitted smoking marijuana, the first
time offender status may have been a result 'Of th~ fact that this was the
firs~ time that he had been apprehended. 79 Nonetheless, the court stated
"still there is no suggestion that the defendant was a seller or induc;:er." ~ 0
The last sentence, assuming some notion of principled decision making,
·might suggest the rule that a seller of marijuana might be incarce:J;"ated.
But in two subsequent decisions, the lower appellate court remanded 'the
cases for resentencing where the defendants had been convicted of sell74 See

\:

J

notes 1387 156 infra and accompanying text.
75 State v. DeGeorge, 113 N.J. Super. 542, 544, 274 A.2d 593, 594 (App. Div. 1971).
76 33 N.J. at 202, 162 A.2d at 854.
77 See. N.J: STAT••ANN. §§ 5:8-1 to -130, 5:9-1 to -25 (1973) (establisliing New ~ersey
state lottery).
·
··
78,H. PACKER 347-54.
79 See 57 N.J. at 81, i70 A.2d at: 4.·
I'.
sold. at 82, 270 A.2d at 5.
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small amounts of marijuana.81 Even though sale of drugs is a different offense, the court suggested that the "non-commercial" seller
should receive probation. The suggestion that the non-commercial seller
is somehow less culpable than the economically successful dealer is based
on assumptions about the drug culture which have little sociological
·validity and less factual support.
. The courts' articulated goal of rehabilitation for possessors and some
·sellers of drugs obscures the consequences of its rulings. Without any
consideration by the court of the actual capability of the probation
service to reform drug users as opposed to gamblers, the court allows
an anomaly to exist. This anomaly exists because the prevailing analysis
does not provide for explicit precedential decision making by appellate
courts in sentencing. The idea that the gambling case might contain a
·principle of decision making that should or should not be extended to
other cases probably would not occur to an appellate court operating
under the present method of analysis.
The proposed analysis, without pretending to be exhaustive at this
juncture, has established two primary rules to be developed by appellate
courts to guide trial judge determination of probation. First, where the
interest promoted by the substantive offense is in doubt, trial judges
should be told to grant probation82 unless some secondary rule would
require some period of incarceration. Secondly, in offenses against state
processes such as selective service offenses and wilful evasion of federal
income tax,83 the trial judge should be told by the appellate courts to
refuse probation unless some secondary rule would require probation.
The apparent penal policy underlying such a rule of incarceration is the
deterrence of others.84 Exceptions to either rule, if any, should be drawn
narrowly. Secondary rules for any offense where the primary rule is
incarceration or non-incarceration might involve factors of mitigation or
.aggravation.85 To the degree that the particular explicit policy of in~g

81 State v. Breenan, 115 N.1. Super. 400, 279 A.2d 900 (App. Div. 1971); State v. Dennery, No. A-1446-69 (N.J. App. Div. July 16, 1971). See generally 3 RUTGERS L.J. 370
(1971).
82Non-incarceration or probation as conditional liberty is still a state process of control'that may be challenged by the individual. Cf. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 41 U.SL.W.
4647 (U.S. May 14; 1973). The development of decisional rules to define roles for probation officers and lawyers or to exercise legal control over them awaits further development. For a discussion of rules of. decisions for a process of conditional liberty
see notes 186-225 infra and accompanying text.
.. 83 See United States v. Whitfield, 401 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v.
Pendergast, 28 F. Supp. 601 (W.D. Mo. 1939).
84 Solomon, Sentences in Selective Service and lncume Tax Cases, 52 F.RD. 481, 484
(1970). See generally ZIMRING, PERSPECTIVES oN DEiERRENCE (1971).
85 See notes 87-110 infra and accompanying text.
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carceration or non-incarceration enraged the public, the legislature might
be moved to reconsider the appropriateness of the substantive offenses
as well as the policy of disposition.86
The Consequences of Prior Adjudication of Criminality.
Appellate courts which do review sentences have used evidence that a convicted individual previously has been convicted of an offense to uphold
the imposition of long periods of incarceration. 87 The justification offered for the use of such data to increase sentences is that convicted mdividuals with prior convictions pose a greater danger to society than
convicted individuals without prior convictions. The inadequacy of the
present approach to the use of prior convictions in sentencing will be
demonstrated under the proposed analysis by a redefinition of the issues
for appellate decision making and through the development of policies
and rules to replace the existing approach.
·
Under the due process model of the criminal law developed by Professor Herbert Packer in The Limits of the Criminal Sanction,5 8 the two
values reinforcing the legality of the guilt determination and thus the
legitimacy of state control over an individual are a fair trial with counsel
and appellate review. 89 Those Supreme Court 'Opinions that appear to
implement these two values at sentencing are actually analyses deai.ing
with constitutional limitations on adjudication. An interest analysis, however, may be used to develop rules for the use of prior convictions iri
sentencing to implement these values in the context of dispositions. Recent pronouncements by the Supreme Court have altered the constitutional framework for reviewing the legality of the use of prior convictions in sentencing without offering a guide to proper sentencing policy
when prior convictions are involved.
In North Carolina v. Pearce90 the Court dealt with the effect of sentencing practices on the unrestrained utilization of the appellate process
86 The argument that the judiciary should await legislative responses to the dysfunctional state of the law of criminal dispositions is based on the assumption that legislatures
will respond rationally to the core problems. However, if recent responses of educated
and well informed members of the public and the legal profession to problems of the
criminal law are indicative o£ popular response to crime, the assumption is unwarranted. See generally Lehman, Crime, the Public and the Crime Cummission: .A Critical
Review of The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, 66 MrCH. L. REv. 1487 (i968).
87 See People v. Jackson, 95 ill. App. 2d 193, 228 N.E.2d 196 (1968). Where the evidence of prior convictions is unreliable, its use is subject to attack on constitutional
grounds. See, e.g., Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); Baker v. United States, 388
F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Myers, 374 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1967).
BBSee H. PACKER 149-73.
89Jd. at 229-38.
90 395 u.s. 711 (1969).
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Qy con,.v.ict~d person~. Th~ Court assumed that a conv.icted defendant
would \Je, deterred from taking an appeal if, .having won a retrial, he not
only might be reconvicted but also might be given a longer sentence
without explanation of the grounds for the increased term. In Pearce,
therefore, the. ,Court held that a successful appellant who is convicted
on retrial· may not be given a greater sentence than he originally receive.d.unless,the trial judge can justify his action. 91 Then the sentence
may . be increased if the trial judge bases it on "identifiable new conduct." 92
Some ;courts and commentators suggest that Pearce prohibits the trial
judge from using new or additional evidence about the nature of the
original offense to justify a harsher punishment upon retrial and reconviction.93. If this interpretation of Pearce is adopted by the Supreme
Court, ~he. Pearce doctrine would seem to mean that a legally proper conviction or adjudication authorized the imposition of a sentence that. cannot be increased except for reasons having nothing to do with the original tn)l·process. Apparently, the Pearce doctrine primarily is concerned
with protecting the value of appellate review of a 'criminal conviction,
as opposed to' adjudication in the broad sense used in this article, siri.ce a
harsher sentence can be imposed by a trial judge after a trial de novo 94
or by a jury.95 As long as the individual has counsel who could invoke
the appellate process, the Court will permit the harsher sentence following a trial de novo- to stand.9G
In Tucker,
United States,97 the Court, reflecting Packer's second
value of a fait trial with counsel, held that a sentencing judge should
not consider a· prior conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright._98 Thus,-. the Court arguably altered the constitutional framework for determining the legality of the use of prior convictions. The
most'important aspect of Tucker is the Court's willingness to develop a
91 1a. at 1is-i6.

v.,

at 726.
93 Peoplcr Payne, 386 Mich. 84, 94-96, 191 N.W.2d 375, 379-81 (1971) 1 rev'd 01l other
grounds, 41 U.SL.W. 4671 (U.S. May 21, 1973); Alpin, Sentence Increases On Retrial
After North Carolina v. Pearce, 39 U. CIN. L. REv.427, 444 (1970).
· 94 Colten v .. Ken~cky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972). But see Alpin, supra note 93, at 455-59,
95Ch~n v .. Stynchcombe, 41 U.SL.W. 4662 (U.S. May 21, 1973).
• 92 Id:

·v.

' 96 Whether, a~ individual can be retried with counsel solely to change a fine or prob.ation .to a j~ sentence under Argersinger v. Hamlin is not discussed. See 407 U.~ •. 25
(1972).' Some courts, adopting a similar formula to Argersinger for counsel ~n lower
c:ourts, h~y-e i11dic:ated new trials for the purP.oses of imprisonment are appropria.te. See
Rodriquez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 277 A.2d 216 (1971). But a determinatio~ of t})at
issue shouid also depend· upon an interpretation of the meaning of Gideon for sen· '
, · ·• :
tencing.
97 404

u.s. 443 (1972).

98 Id.

at 448~9; see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

.. .
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dpctrine at sentencing to. implement the value. of a fair t:Pai: ~his will.,..
ingness is particularly dramatic in that the. Court's decision· required. a
resentencing in .a 20 year old case that had reached the Supreme· Court
by way of a post-conviction relief petition.99 There is no need. to consider whether the defendant in fact was guilty of the prior conviction
since under the Court's analysis of Gideon, the prior guilt· determination
without counsel automatically is infirm.100 The Court, however, fails to
indicate how an appellate court is to determine whether. the trial judget
in. sentencing or resenten,cing, has used the infirm prior conviction to
enhance punishment in viohition of the Tucker rules. One possible resolu:...
tion of this issue is to develop a standard similar to the Courfs doctriri.e
governing the jury's consideration of prior convictions ~btained in vio'lation of Gideon in making its determination of guilt.101 Tlie Court could
as'sume that a .sentencing··judge, like an adjudicating jury, may place un~
due emphasis :on the evidence of prior convictions. In th~ case of· a
tainted jury verdict, however; the defendant is. entitled t~. ~ ne:w trial by
a ·new jury where the infirm prior convictions cannot.be)agrilltted..With
a sentencing. judge no .such .easy solution iS available; 'Vthough. some
courts have assumed that Tucker requires limited disclosure· to defens-e
couns~l of prior convictions contained in presentenc~ reports,102 ·ap.:..
parently on the theory that counsel then will be able to determine if any
of the prior convictions had been obtained in violation 'of Gideon. 103 ..
Were the implementation of the Tucker rule to ·reacli the -Su:prem~
Col,lrt, the Court might be tempted t6 experiment with trties about disclosure of presentence· reports· or use the technique of preSumptions· of
individual response to'triai.judge sentencing behavior as it ·(lid:in Pearc~.
A'better approach to the issue·would be for the Court to lookat~Tucker
and Pearce together in order to hegin the tentative outline of a theory
of due process for sentencin&"· The Court could see t~at the t:Wo ·cases~
99Jd. at 445.
100 &:e

Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
. .....
10iSee Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S.'107, i09 (1967).
.
. .
.
.,
102See United States v. Picard; 464 F.2d 215 (lst.Cir. 1972);,United S~atJ v. Janie~.
464 F.2d 126 (3d Cir.1972).
.
.
' . ' ..
..
103 The issue has begun to trouble some courts. One court has ·determin~d that a federal hearing is not required if the sentencing judge· thinks the original sentence is still
appropriate. See Lipscomb .v. Clark, 168. F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1972). An.oP'!er COll;ft, hold:ing that Argersinger_ is not .retroactive, cited as its re~oning the effect· of retro<tctivity
on parole, probation .and re5entencihg. See Potts v. Superintendent, 2i3' :va. 432; '192
S.E;2d 780 (1972).· A 'third court has· held that retroactivity of Leary v. ·United States
itivalidates a: prior convi~tion ~obtamed in. violation of Leary'.
.llivhlia~tioii 'o( ~~
prior'' conviction meatit. the conuhitment under the state's habitrial offeiirler·· s\::ii:Ufe \va5
invalid. Taylor v. United States, 472 F.2d 1178 (8th Cir. 1973); Ex parte Taylor, 484
S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Grim. App. 1972); see Leary v. United States, 395·.-HS. ·6::(:1.969.):-~
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read together, involve the implementation of Professor Packer's two
values of the due process model. For the purpose of developing rules
that deal direcdy with the questions of sentencing, the Court should
treat the two values of fair trial and appellate review as involving one
value or interest. That value is the form of adjudication in modern criminal law. Under this approach, the defendants in Tucker and Pearce are
permitted to challenge the legality of their sentences because the basic
form of the decision making in criminal law is at stake. If the Court is
willing to define litigable issues at sentencing in terms of previous involvements with criminal adjudication, the Court should determine that
the individuals within the criminal process have a cognizable interest in
that form of adjudication.
To assert that individuals can litigate their prior involvement with the
criminal law at sentencing is not to formulate a sentencing policy for
the use of prior convictions. However, by redefining the issue involved
in the use of prior convictions in terms of prior adjudication, the sentencing policy could be stated as a presumption that punishment may be
inflicted solely on the basis of the offense for which the individual has
been convicted in the instant case. That is the only conviction for which
the sentencing judge can be sure that there has been a proper adjudication in the broadest sense. Such a dispositional policy could be articulated as a constitutional principle of due process.104 Alternatively, the
policy could be grounded in an interpretation of the thirteenth amendment. Functionally, the amendment could be read to create such a presumption by an interpretation of the words "duly convicted." 105 In conjunction with notions of due process the thirteenth amendment could be
read to mean that trial judges should not be required to determine
whether any prior conviction was obtained in conformity with constitutionally required standards. Rather the trial judge should be authorized
to sentence for the convicted offense as the only one for which the individual has been "duly convicted."
The suggestion that trial judges at sentencing cannot assume that individuals with prior convictions are more dangerous than those without
prior convictions does not mean that the legal system should not differentiate between the two classes of persons. The proposed rule recognizes a distinction between them by allowing first offenders to mitigate
their sentences. The proposed analysis prohibits the trial judge from increasing sentences on the basis of prior convictions simply as a means
104See generally Cohen, supra note 10; Kadish, Legal Norm tmd Discretion in the
Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARv. L. REv. 904 (1962); Pugh & Carver, mpra note
10.
105 See

note 19 supra.
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of questioning the assumption of greater dangerousness. Recidivist statistics,. while impressive to some public officials, do not prove the as"sumption.106 In effect the legal system must make a value determination,
and the proposed analysis strikes the balance in favor of minimizing the
amount of state interference. Legislation is required for the legal system
to be authorized to impose special dispositions for persistent offenders.
Existing habitual offender statutes may be inadequate as the policy underlying such statutes is not clear.107 The legislatures are limited in the
types of assumptions they can make concerning the dispositions that
should .flow from legislatively prohibited conduct.108 More importantly,
if the legislature wants to mandate dispositions based on assumptions
about criminal behavior, as trial judges have done, it would be required
to develop standards for predicting future behavior. This task presents
difficulty since criminal adjudication in the modern sense generally is
engaged in a process of determining what events occured in the past.100

If, however, the legislature were willing to make clear that an habitual
offender statute exists for the purpose of retribution, the courts would
then be faced with the issue of whether the policy of retribution is a
justification for the disposition and accompanying process of decision
making.110

Dispositiowl Criteria for Multiple Convictions.
The present
manner of handling the problem of multi-count convictions under a
single indictment is itself a demonstration of the need for new sentencing
standards. Development of alternative standards requires a functional
analysis by the appellate courts. Using such an analysis, the courts first
should ascertain the legislative purpose in providing for various statutory
~chemes proscribing similar or related forms of conduct. Second, the
analysis should generate hypotheses for the existence of a requirement
of multiple count prosecutions in modern criminal law. Third, an interlOG H. PACKER

46-47.

107 See In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972) (aggravated
penalty for second conviction of indecent exposure unconstitutional). Compare Marshall
v. Parker, 470 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. granted sub nom., Marshall v. United States,
93 S.Ct. 1429 (1973) with Watson v. United States, 439 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
108 See notes 186-225 infra and accompanying text.
109 Cf., Goldstein & Katz, Dangeroumess and Mental Illness-Some Observatio11S on the
Decision to Release Perso11S Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225, 233-37
(1960).
110 Compare Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 304 (1972) (Brennan, ]., concurring)
(retribution not justified) with id. at 306 (Stewart, ]., concurring) (retribution permissible). While habitual offender laws have withstood legal attack in the past, such acts
may be reconsidered. See Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration, 21 U.
BUFF. L. REv. 99 (1971).
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est.analysis of all the counts of.conviction should be used to determine
whether consecutive sentences, concurrent sentences or a general sentence should be imposed upon convictio:q.
· Even where appellate courts assume that they have no general power
to review sentences, they have attempted to develop some standards fot
the trial judge sentencing in multiple conviction situations.111 The existence of multiple offenses within a statutory scheme proscribing similar conduct has not been treated as indicative of a legislative purpose
authorize trial judges tQ impose several sentences either consecutively
or concurrently upon conviction. Rather, the appellate courts have used
canons of statutory construction to develop standards for sentencing.
Given a legislative scheme that allows for the prosecution and convictiorl
of an individual on several counts or offenses under a single indictment,
the appellate coUrt: can choose between the rule of leniency112 and the
rule of harshness in 'determining legislative intent. The rule of leniency
has been employed to require that the trial judge impose only a single
sentence where the legislative intent as tQ multiple punishm,ent is hi
doubt or where the intent was to provide alternative avenues of prosecution or to create alternative classes of wrong .doers differe:qt~ated by
graduations of punishment.113 However, the rule of harshness' ·used it
the appellate court perceives a clear legislative sentenci!lg policy to au-;thoriie multiple punishments in th'e ena.ctment Qf the. stat;ut~.U4 As a
iCS?lt of the use'of the two canons of construction, a'pers~rt convicted of
various federal narcotic violations under a single indic~ent .formerly
was subject to consecutive sentences,115 while a person convicted of mul.:
tiple counts under the federal bank robbery statute was 5ubject to onlY
a· ~ingle sentence. The justification offered for this diSparity in treatme~~
is based on the two kinds 'of perceived legislative policies towards sen7
tencing in the enactment of the offenses.
·
1
The harshness-leniency distinction leads to haphazard applications1 ~
since the distinction assumes, in line with the existing analysis, that· the
development of standards for sentencing is essentially a legislative pre:
rogative. Under the proposed model, the principles of dispositions fot
multip~e convictions should be developed through an interest analysisl-

to

is

111 See, e.g., Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958); Prince v. United States, 352
U.S. 322 (1957); United 'States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218 (1952). .
·
.:
112Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALEL.J. 262, 313 (1965).
113 But see Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 391 (1957).
·
' 11~/d.
115/d. at 388.
nssee Heideman v.·United States, 281 F.2d 8,05 (8th C~. 19~0) (six 'forged money
oraers-six convictions); Carlson v. United States,- 274 ·F.2d 694 (~~h.. Cf: _196_0) (£oj$cd,
checks-four years for each of four checks).
· \· '· ·
·, ··
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The goal of such principles -is to define the. limits of· the trial judge?s
authority to impose what should be viewed ·as unnecessary judicial: mtiltiplication of pumshment. The multiple disposition dilemma under the
.f~deral bank robbery statute presents an example of the inadequacy--of
present attempts to develop appropriate standards under a statutory
scheme which defines several ways in which an offense can be conimitted.117
· . In United States v. Prince118 the Supreme Court held that, for purposes of sentencing, the conviction of an individual for both entering
·with intent to rob and armed robbery constituted one offense. The Court
reasoned that the lesser offense merged into the more aggrava~ed count119
117 The federal

bank robbery statute reads in part:
(a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts
to take, from the person or presence of another any property or money or
any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan
association; or
Whoever enters or attempts to .enter any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association, or any building used in whole or in pai:t: as a bank,
credit union, or as a savings and loan association, with intent to commit in
such bank, credit union, or in such savings and loan association, or building,
or part thereof,· so used, any felony affecting such bank, credit union, or
such savings and loan association and in violation of any statute of the United
States, or any larcenyShall be fined not more than .$5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both.
(b) Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any
property or money or any other thing in value exceeding $100 belonging
to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of any bank,
credit union, or any savings and loan association, shall be fined not more
than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; or
Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any
property or money or any other thing of value not exceeding $100 belonging
to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession o£ any bank,'
credit union, or any savings and loan association, shall be fined not more
than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
(c) Whoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes
of, any property or money or other thing of value knowing the same to
have been taken from a bank, credit union, or a savings and loan association,
in violation of subsection (b) of this section shall be subject to the punishment provided by said subsection (b) for the taker.
(d) Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or puts "
in jeopardy the life of any pe~son by the use of a dangerous weapon or de'. . vice. shall· b~ fin,ed. not· g10re than $10,000 or imprison~d not more than ..
twenty-five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2113 (a)-(d) (1970).
118 352 u.s. 322 (1957).
119Jd. at 328.
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and therefore vacated the trial judge's 20 and 15 year consecutive terms
and ordered resentencing.l 20
The logical extension of the Court's merger theory, however, necessarily will not prevent the multiplication of punishment if the trial judge
has imposed a greater term under section 2113 (a) than under section
2113 (d) of the federal bank robbery statute.121 Such was the case in
United States v. Corson122 where the trial judge under a three count indictment had sentenced the defendant to 10 years under Count I for
violation of section 2113 (a) to be followed by a five year term for the
violation of section 2113 (a) charged in Count II. The defendant also
was sentenced to five years probation under Count III for violation of
section 2113 (d), to run consecutively after the expiration of the prior
15 year term. Two years after his imprisonment, the defendant filed a
motion under rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure providing for the correction of an illegal sentence at anytime.123 The court
faced a dilemma because of previous interpretation of the scope of the
trial judge's power to modify a sentence under rule 35,124 and a logical
interpretation of the merger theory meant that the only count that survived the merger was Count III.125 A desire for strict symmetry in the
supposedly rational theory of merger of counts did not prevent the
court from realizing the absurdity of allowing the defendant suddenly
to be on probation or "set free" as the dissent urged.126 The court's solution was to require a general sentence on all counts rather than a single
sentence on any particular count,127 thereby preserving the right of the
defendant to appeal the conviction on any one count128 and preventing
the multiplication of punishment. However, the court had modified existing practice without explicit discussion. Because the imposition of consecutive or concurrent sentences under the bank robbery statute had
been viewed as a technical error, a motion under rule 35 previously had
not required the presence of the defendant for correction.129 Here the
appellate court viewed the entire sentencing process as illegal since it
was the culmination of sentencing that was error. Thus an order vacating
the sentence on any particular count recently approved by the higher
120 I d.

at 329.
note 117 supra.
122 449 F .2d 544 (3d Cir. 1971).
121 See

123 Fro. R. CtuM. P. 35.
124See Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959).
125 See United States v. Corson, 449 F .2d 544, 552 (3d
126 449 F .2d at 550-51.
127 Id. at 552.
128 Id. at 550.
129 See United States v. Phillips, 403 F.2d 963 (6th Cir.

Cir. 1971) (Hastie, J., dissenting).
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court would not correct the error. The appellate court required the
presence of the defendant and required a resentencing, apparently with
the presence of counsel over four years after his original sentence had
been imposed.130
The result in the case is correct under the analysis proposed, but the
court refuses to acknowledge that despite hundreds of opinions dealing
with the Prince doctrine, multiple sentences still exist.131 The court should
have faced the issue of trial judge discretion directly. The heretofore
technical error in sentencing is evidence of an improper exercise of judicial discretion. The error is an indication that the judge has failed to
understand that the legislature grants him limited authority to sentence.132
A trial judge who ignores the implications of Prince in his sentencing has
failed to understand the narrow federal interest in defining the conduct
as criminal and the narrow scope of his dispositional power. The appellate court should articulate that, in terms of an interest analysis, the federal bank robbery statute promotes the federal government's interest in
private property. Such an analysis would allow an appellate court to
generate the other sentencing questions such as whether as a general rule
a term of incarceration should be imposed for a violation of the statute,
and if so, how long a period of incarceration is ordinarily necessary.
The interest analysis could be applied more generally when an appellate court faces a situation of multiple· coiwictions. A state with complete administrative sentencing such as California would want to take
into consideration the-fact that another state agency would ·deCide the
period of incarceration in setting parole eligibility periods. 133 A state
with a more conventional minimum and maximum indeterminate sen..:
tencing scheme should move towards a system of general sentences based
on the interest sought in the counts adjudicated. If the crinies are urirelated in terms of an interest analysis a single sentence for each interest
might be permissible.
·
The proposed analysis, however is insufficient at this junctui:e to suggest a policy to deal with multiple sentence problems involvmg two jurisdictions/34 as where a defendant serving' a sentence in state A is before
a sentencing judge in state B. The analysis does suggest, however, that an
appellate court seeking to develop such a policy should recognize that
130 Id. at 964-65. It is not clear what-functian counsel' performs at this resentencing
other than protecting against an increased· sentence, assuming an increase is impermissible
in this situation. Cf. United States v. Chapman, 448 F.2d 1381 (3d Cii. 1971).
131 See ·United States v. Shelton, 465 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1972);
132 United States v. Welty, 426 F.2d 615, 618 (3d Cir. 1970).
133 See generally Johnson, Multiple Punis!mzent and Consecutive Sentences: Reflections
(11l. the Neal Doctrine, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 357 (1970).
134See R. DoNNELLY, J. GoLDSTEIN, & R. ScHwARTZ, CRIMINAL LA'Y 377-395 (1962).·. •
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the sentencing problem relates to the two states' policy or lack of policy
on detainers. A broader question which also must be resolved where an
individual faces multiple punishment in different jurisdictions is the degree of state control the total legal system may impose upon any one
individual.135
While the proposed analysis cannot suggest a clear path of reform to
deal with all the problems of multiple punishment, appellate courts should
begin to use the interest analysis to develop policy for multiple sentences.
Judicially developed policy can distinguish the problems of multiple
prosecution from the problems of multiple punishment although they
are related under the interest analysis. Of particular importance are the
emerging principles that will require a joinder of factually related claims
in a single prosecution.136 Furthermore, judicially developed criteria can
take into account the possible effects of multiple sentences upon individuals in other parts of the dispositional process. While the adverse effect of multiple sentences on parole release now is postulated rather than
demonstrated,137 the judicial policy can evolve as decisions of correctional officials become more visible to the judiciary. The failure of the proposed analysis to offer more guidance to appellate courts attempting to
deal with the problems of multiple sentences in part is attributable to
the failure of courts and commentators to develop legal rules to deal
with the primary issues of single count sentencing.
The Effect of the Individual's Refusal to Cooperate with the Legal SysThe proposed analysis postulates that one of the interests
tem.
promoted by the criminal laws is a concept of individual liberty, although that concept may be only a policy from which to generate specific principles and rules138 and its implications for criminal law decision
making are far from clear. However, the definition of the concept of
liberty for some purposes may be derived from the fifth amendment insofar as the amendment embodies a right of individual non-cooperation
with the criminal process.139 Despite some attempt to extend such a
right beyond adjudication to the disposition decision, a defendant's refusal to cooperate with the legal process by refusing to come forward
135 Id •

. l36See

Schaefer, Unresolved Issues of the Law of Double Jeopardy, 58 CALIF. L. REv.
of Unitary Criminal Con-

1391, 1398 (1970); Note Multiple Prosecution tmd Ptmislmzem
duct-Minn. Stat.§ 609.035,56 MINN. L. REv. 646,660 (1972).
137 See

generally Note, Civil Disabilities of Felons, 53

VA.

L. REv. 403 (1969).

138See Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 14 (1967).
139 But for other government purposes the fifth amendment is not defined

in such a
fashion. Cf. Meltzer, Privileges Against Self-Incrimination and the Hit-and-Rtm Opinions,
1971 SUP. CT. REv. 1.
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with information about the nature of his crime still may be used to justify
the imposition of a harsher sentence than if the defendant had cooperated. Under the proposed analysis, appellate courts should review th~
application of fifth amendment principles and, therefore, must define the
scope of the individual's right to refuse to cooperate with the legal system at disposition.
Where the guilt or innocence of the individual is being adjudicated,
the legal system defines the concept of individual liberty to mean that
the individual has a right not to cooperate with the adjudicatory process.
As a principle of constitutional dimensions, this right often is embc;>died
in the concept underlying the fifth amendment that the government
should shoulder the entire burden of adjudication. 140 In the investigative
phase of the criminal process, the fifth amendment has been interpreted
to mean that government officials have an obligation to inform t~e individual of his right to silence or non-cooperation. 141 This right extend~
through trial, and the judge and the prosecutor may not even comment
on the accused's silence for fear that the jury might infer guilt from the
accused's failure to testify. 142 Finally, the Supreme Court has evaluated
the effect of various statutory sentencing schemes on the accused's right
of non-cooperation and has invalidated schemes that tended to encourage
individuals to forfeit such rights.143
For appellate courts even to suggest that the fifth amendment mean~
that the individual has the same right not to cooperate at sentencing a5
he has during adjudication demonstrates the need to distinguish between
adjudication and disposition. The essence of any disposition compels the
individual's cooperation. In fact, the fifth amendment embodies a right
not to cooperate at adjudication because the result of the adjudicatory
process is disposition. By maintaining the distinction between disposition
and adjudication, the goal of minimizing state control could mean that
some limits to the state's power to compel individual cooperation may
exist. Before any such interest analysis is possible, however, overall standards for disposition must be developed. To be able to articulate standards
for sentencing, the appellate courts must isolate the purpose of disposition in the given case. With a purpose of disposition in mind, a court
then is able to decide what minimal amount of individual cooperation
must be required in order to achieve the dispositional goal.
140See United States v. Kastigar, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n
o£New York, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
141 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
142 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
143 See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
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Courts committed to the existing approach to sentencing recognize
the need for some evidence on which to base their disposition decisions,
and the practice of using pre-sentence reports thereby has developed.
In their attempts to individualize sentencing, courts have relied on a
wide range of evidence which concerns the convicted persons. Because
the trial judge has complete discretion in the use ·of this information in
his decision, the defendant arid his lawyer have had little need to examine
the report.
A few courts have recognized some danger in the use of pre-sentence
reports and require that the report be disclosed to the defendant's lawyer.144 Consistent with the existing analysis, the lawyer is given an opportunity to demonstrate the inaccuracy or unreliability of the information in the report.145 The idea that the lawyer might use the information
gained through disclosure to request the application of a particular rule
of sentencing has not yet been developed. Furthermore, the rule of trial
judge discretion in sentencing through the use of pre-sentencing reports
in at least some instances is equivalent to a rule of probation officer discretion, since it is the probation officer who gathers the information used
by the judge. The legal system, however, provides no guidance as to
what kinds of information are relevant since no rules currently exist for
the grant or denial of probation. The need to control probation officers
l;las been indicated by some courts, but without explicit discussion of
sentencing policy.
When the probation officer exceeds his admittedly wide latitude in
gathering information about the defendant, the sentence imposed by the
trial judge constitutionally is invalid if the judge relied upon the information.146 The rule apparently is that a confession-information from the
individual about to be sentenced-not legally admissible at adjudicative
stages may not be used as evidence in sentencing. The purpose behind the
rule appears to be to keep the probation officer from asking improper
questions of the defendant and is not an attempt to overturn an incorrect
sentence. Clearly, therefore, there currently is no way to ensure the imposition of a proper disposition at resentencing. The ineffectiveness of
the rule demonstrates the need to develop standards that determine what
evidence is relevant and rules that prevent probation officers from exercising more coercive power over an individual's fate than is necessary.
144 See State v. Kunz, 55 N.J. 128, 259 A.2d 895 (1969).
145 See Note, Disclosure of Presentence Reports: A Comtitutirmal Right to Rebttt

Adverse lnfo1'111ation by Cross-Examination, 3 RUT. CAMDEN L.J. 111 (1971).
14.6See United States ex rei. Brown v. Rundle, 417 F.2d 282 (:Jd Cir. 1969).
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More ·generally, guidelines are neeqed for determining what are· the
proper-means of gatherip.g evidence for the sentencing decision.147
Under existing analysis, some appellate courts have discussed the rela..:
tionship of plea bargaining to the -trial judge sentencing policy~ When a
trial judge· indicated on the record, perhaps foolishly under present
standards, that he gave the defendant a harsher sentence because the de~
fendant had pleaded not- guilty after his codefendant pleaded guilty, an
appellate court invalidated the sentence.148 The appellate court thought
that the effect of such a policy· of differentiation at sentencing tended to
discourage other defendants from pl~ading not guilty. In. another decision, a trial judge indicated that he had imposed a harsh sentence because the defendant had pleaded not guilty; the appellate court invalidated
the sentence, but without defining the parameters of the defendant's fifth
amendment right not to cooperate at sentencing.149 In most cases, appellate courts have no evidence on which to invalidate .the trial .judge's
s~ntence because trial judges generally are no~ ,required to state_ ·.~he
grounds for the sentence they impose.150 ):he appellate decisions discussed
147 Existing analysis is inadequate to determine what means of gathering evidence for
the sentencing decisions are proper. Cumpare United States v. V-erdugo, 402 F .2d 599,
616 (9th Cir.) (Browning, ]., separate opinion), cert. denied, 397 U.~ .. 925 (1968) (indication that an individual's "right'' of privacy is violated by the use of illegally seized
evidence at sentencing) with United States ~· Schipani, 315 F. Supp. 253 ~ED.N;Y.),
lljf'd, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971) (refusal to reduce
a sentence where the judge has used evidence illegally obtained by the_ police·
tJie
original ·sentence). Using the concept of liberty is a tool of analysis rather than the
broad notions of an exclusionary rule or rights of f.:lirness, it is apparent that the Second
Circuit result is the correct view. The imponant i5:>ue at sentencing is control over a
particular state official-the probation .officer-whose conduct will affecy the individual
directly. To the degree the concept of liberty is viewed as e!Jlbodying the notion of
non-cooperation, ·the rule requiring a resentence where the probation officer questioned
improperly is a correct one. See United States ex rel: Brown v. Runde!, 417 F.2d 28~
(3d Cir. 1969). However, if the primary purpose of the fourth amendment is to pr~tect
individuals from unreasonable government intrusion, the supervision by the probation
officer is a form of government control that entails some intrusions upon the individual.
Any attempt to develop legal rules for d~position should recognize th'<lt a dispositional
official h'Ke a probation officer, who is of most immediate concern to the convicted individual, may make intrusions upon the individual that an investigative agent cannot.
Similarly, the dispositional official cannot perform the functions_ of an in~estigative
agent. Thus the probation officer in charge of a halfway house can search an ~mate's
room without a warrant but cannot question the inmate about the crime without legally
required warnings. State v. Williams, 486_S.W.2d 201 (Mo. 1972). .
... , ,
What types of constitutional infirmity in a prior conviction render its use as evidence
at sentencing illegal has also divided couns. Compare United States v. Penta, 475 _F.2d
92, 96 (Ist Cir. 1973) (Aldrich, J., concurring) with Beto v. Stacks, 408 F.2d 313 (5th Cir.
.
'
.
\ . ,'
1969).
.
. 148 See United States v. Scott, 419 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
~- ·
149 See United States· v. Thomas, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966).
150 See Frankel, supra note 6, at 9. ': ·
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above simply may encourage trial judges not to give any indications as
to the reasons for their decisions, thus decreasing the amount of evidence
available for appellate review.
The failure of the courts to articulate the impact on sentencing of the
accused's right not to cooperate with the legal process, as recognized at
adjudication, has led to a dilemma for the criminal law. A defendant
who received the maximum sentence for the crime he had committed
argued that his fifth amendment rights had been violated where the trial
judge indicated that the sentence had something to do with the failure
of the defendant to come forward with more information about the nature 'Of his crime.151 Consistent with the proposed analysis, the trial judge
had reasoned that the crime was one of public corruption which was a
crime against state processes. The apparent sentencing policy was deterrence of others.152 Furthermore, the judge specifically stated that where
the crime of public corruption was involved, he was under no obligation
to consider rehabilitation as a possible goal of sentencing.153 Because the
defendant refused to identify others who may have been involved with
the public corruption, the trial judge reasoned that there was no reason
to mitigate the sentence.154 On review, the appellate court simply dismissed the defendant's fifth amendment claim on the grounds that the
defendant's right of appeal had not been infringed and that the sentence
was within the trial judge's discretion. 155 The trial judge's opinion explicitly had raised a serious issue of sentencing policy concerning whether
sentencing may be used as an investigative tool to expose the alleged
criminal activity of others. Under the proposed analysis, the appellate
court should have decided whether such sentencing policy constituted
too much legal control over the particular individual who happened to
be apprehended and convicted.156 By sidestepping these issues, the appellate court failed to develop sentencing standards badly needed by the
lower courts.
A rule for dispositions that the trial judge should not consider mitigation of the sentence in a crime of public corruption unless the defendant
151 United
i52 See

States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1972).
icl. at 182 n.2.

153]cl.
154 If the defendant later cooperated, the parole board might mitigate the sentence at
that time. See United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402

u.s. 911

(1971).

155 454 F .2d

at 183-84.
the morality of deterrence of others as a legitimate goal of sentencing
of a given individual does not lead necessarily to the conclusion that the legal system
should use the particular individual to apprehend other suspected individuals. See g~mo
erally Andenaes, The Morality of Deterrence, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 649 (1970).
156 Admitting
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comes forward to id_entify his cohorts may well be compatible with the
proposed approach'. The interest analysis attempts to limit state control
over convicted individuals to the minimum extent necessary to achieve
the state's dispositional goal. Rules for sentencing thus must strike a balance between the government's need for information to pursue its dispositional goal and the individual's right of non-cooperation. In this context,
the goal of promoting a concept of individual liberty plays a large role in
criminal law decision making.
The selection of the permissible range of dispositions that is authorized
upon any adjudication of criminality is, of course, a legislative functiori.
Even under the interest analysis some judicially developed rules for sentencing, particularly those replacing the latitude traditionally granted to
trial judges, similarly would be subject to legislative modification or
reversal. Nevertheless, such legislative review would have to be guided
by some judicially-imposed limitations since the judiciary has the power
to declare some legislatively authorized dispositions illegal. Other judicially developed rules might reflect policies so fundamental to modern criminal law that they would have a constitutional basis not subject to direct
legislative modification. If the legislature disagreed with a particular
penal policy articulated in court opinions developing or applying rules
of sentencing, it should reformulate the policy only after careful consideration of the implications of the court's policy for legal rule making.
PART

II

.ALLOCATING DEciSION MAKING REsPoNSIBILITY BETWEEN THE jUDICIARY
AND CRIMINAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
The extension of the due process revolution to sentencing has ended
the era of judicial reluctance to review inmates' complaints against correction officials' decisions.157 Courts no longer speak in terms of "grace"
or "privilege" 158 when reviewing constitutional challenges to co~ection
decisions concerning internal prison discipline and parole. However, unless all decisions by correction officials are to involve constitutional issues for judicial resolution, principles of limitations on judicial review
must be found to guide courts in deciding the question of which decisions
may be left to the discretion of correction officials and which must be
approved or disapproved by the judiciary.
The answer to that broad question lies in a legal analysis that allocates
decision making between the judiciary and criminal administrative agen157 See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); McGinnis v. Royster, 332 F. Supp. 973
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 410 U.S. 263 (1973); cf. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
158 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 474 (1972).
·
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cies. The analysis previously proposed to develop standards for trial
judge sentencing begins with the concept 'Of individual liberty embodying
the overall goal of minimizing the amount of state control over convicted
individuals. This concept should begin the analysis of post-sentencing
problems as well. An equally important goal, but one which potentially
conflicts with the goal of minimizing state control, is that of maintaining
state control over convicted individuals. This continuing control should
be justified because, if the proposed approach to sentencing in Part I is
adopted, there should be some assurance that the individuals in prison
are those whose incarceration will promote the goals of the legal system.
Another point of departure is the distinction between adjudication and
disposition. The effect of the distinction in the post-sentence area is that
it permits courts to recognize that parole and prison officials are not, and
should not be, the same kind of decision makers as judges, and that the
rules developed should reflect this difference. The present analysis used
in judicial review of intra-prison discipline practices and parole decisions
often has achieved the proper allocation of decision making responsibility, but the courts have not always recognized explicitly the issue of
proper allocation. The proposed analysis makes explicit the issue of allocation and raises questions for judicial resolution if the present trend
of judicial review of correction decisions continues.
LIMITATIONS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF SANCTIONS WITHIN THE
STATE INCARCERATION PROCESS

·Legislatures have delegated to a variety of agencies the authority to
control inmates confined in penal institutions.159 Like most administrative
!>g~es, thes_e agencies have implicit rule malting powers that include the
j)qwer to promulgate J;Ules of conduct. The penal institutions are unique
among criminal administra~ve agencies in that the penal officials may
develop form~l and informal processes to impose sanctions for breaches
of rules and regulations. Prison officials may impose sanctions by altering
tpe terms upon which an inmate receives food, clothing, and medical
,c~e, an<;! even by limiting the social intercourse available with other
~ates. Applying the concept of liberty, a court should determine
whether the ljmitations on individual freedom which these sanctions
represent are 'rational iri terms of the ptirposes of the confinement.
: . 'fhe judiciary should modify its present constitutional analysis of the
wi.de variety of sanctions used in prison. The courts first should limit the
-~le making power -of the prison admini~tration to the promulgation of
·l59See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 4001, 4002 (1970); ARK. STAT. ANN;§ 46-131 (1964); CoNN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-81 (Supp. 1973); FLA~ STAT. ANN. §~ 944.09, 944.14 (1973);
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that articulate what conduct will subject an individual to some
sanction. Second, ·a proceeding to determille whether the proscribed conduct has occurred should be required to insure thelegitimacy of the irrlpcisition of any sanctions. Third, the courts should limit the form and
~ature of the sanctions available to prison officials.

Limits on Promulgation.
Judicial limitations on the authority·of
prison officials to proscribe conduct through prison rules serve two purposes. First, such limitations are a means of requiring a logical nexus between conduct sanctioned by prison rules and the purp'ose of confine"'
ment in the particular institution. Prison officials should not be able· to
proscribe conduct which, had it occurred outside the institution, :would
have been adjudicated in the criminal process. "Low visibility'' prison
fact :finding cannot perform all of the functions of criminal adjudication,
~pecially to the extent that criminal adjudication is the means of articulating the fundamental interests of modem criminal law. Second, the
proposed limitations on the rule making power of prison officials force
such officials to consider the implications of the concept of individual
liberty within the prison. In devising a prison disciplinary code under
these limitations, the prison officials still have the option of reviewing the
offending conduct in an intra-prison fact :finding process, subjecting th~
accused inmate to a criminal adjudication, or of ,not applying any_ legal
machinery to the situation. When the last option is chosen, a concep~ of
liberty is promoted within the state confinement process in that the conduct cannot further be sanctioned by any state official.
·
· ·
The :first limitation that the judidary should impose upon the correction officials' rule making power is that there must be written rules.160
Within the broad goal of protecting the security of the particular institution, the prison officials should devise rules to protect the inmates and
prison employees from invasions of their persons and private .property.
However, the scope of these rules should be limited so as to minimize
overlap with the protections provided by the criminal process for bodily
security and private property.
The proper exercise of this rule making .power may be demonstrated
in the development of prison rules concerning assaults in a maximum
security prison. Simple assaults between inmates should be governed by
rules which recognize that when individuals live together in close proximity, some ir).terference with bodily security is inevitable. The rules also
must recognize that, despite the goal of protecting bodily security in the
c~~al law, there are instances where the legal system chooses ~ot to
160 See L.

FULLER, THE MoRALITY oF LAw 46 {rev. ed.: 1969).
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use its most coercive sanctions against an individual guilty of assault, as
in the case of simple assaults between family members.161 By analogy,
the occurrence of conduct in the prison that otherwise might lead to a
minor criminal conviction need not require criminal adjudication if the
intra-prison discipline process serves some minimal social function. By
"sanctioning" the simple assault within the prison, the legal system promotes the security of the prison through the use of the least coercive
instrument.
The allocation to prison officials of responsibility to define a simple
assault allows the scope of the category to be determined at the appropriate level. Thus, a minimum or medium security prison may have a
broader category of s4nple assaults than a maximum security institution.
The goal of maintaining prison security may be given a different emphasis in each kind of institution. By delineating the question for rule making, the judiciary simply would be recognizing that the matter is within
the expertise 'Of the prison officials who can best determine what risks
they are willing to take in devising rules of conduct within the range
of sanctions available.
However, if the charge against an inmate is aggravated assault against
a prison guard or fellow inmate, the intra-prison discipline system may
be an inappropriate agency to apply sanctions. The alleged conduct is
sufficiently serious to invoke the criminal process, and the prison procedures lack the legitimization necessary to justify the imposition of
major dispositions. The courts should limit the rule making power of the
prisons where serious crimes are involved, thereby preserving the adjudicative functions of the criminal law and avoiding serious constitutional questions.
Another broad limitation 'On the rule making power of prisons which
already has been adopted by some courts is the application of a "standard
of necessity" in reviewing prison officials' decisions.162 The proposed
analysis would articulate the necessity standard in terms of the concept
of individual liberty and protection 'Of prison security. For instance, one
court recently held that an inmate could not be sanctioned for writing
a letter critical of the prison administration to someone outside the pris161 See

notes 222-225 infra and accompanying text.
e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Wright v. McMann, 387
F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); Ramsey v. Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Holt
v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (ED. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Jordan
v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (ND. Cal. 1966); Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa. 83, 280 A.2d 110 (1971). See also Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the
Police and Sentencing Proc~sses, 75 HARv. L. REv. 904 (1962).
162 See,
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on. 163 Although the court spoke solely in terms of the inmate's right of
free expression,l 64 an equally significant consideration was that the conduct presented no threat to prison security. 165
In another decision, prison officials were not permitted to punish an
inmate for kissing his wife good-bye while on work release.166 \Vhile the
court spoke in terms of the adverse effects upon rehabilitation in limiting
social intercourse, the result should have been justified on the basis of the
standard of necessity and the requirement of pre-existing rules. There is
no clear necessity to prohibit the· inmate's ordinary social intercourse
while on work release. Furthermore, the court could have decided the
case by holding that conduct which does not violate any specific preexisting rules cannot be sanctioned. The latter rationale does not require
the court to endorse a particular penal policy and thereby allows leeway
for the development of specific rules by prison officials to govern the
conduct. The prison administration might be able to justify a specific
rule prohibiting or limiting social intercourse on work release on the
basis of some policy behind the work release program, and such a rule
might prohibit the kissing. The purpose of forcing legal distinctions .to
be made on the basis of the policies behind work release rather than the
harm or value in kissing is to minimize the direct interference by the
state with normal social intercourse.

Legitimizing the Imposition of Prison Stmctions.
Courts. have
begun to apply principles of "rudimentary due process" 167 to the review
of sanctions imposed by prison administrators, leading to a requirement
that some legitimizing process take place before the inmate is made to
suffer "grevious loss." 168 Under the approach, grevious loss to the inmate involves denial of the benefits of normal social intercourse in prison
or collateral consequences such as loss of good time credit.169 The legitimizing process under current practice most frequently invoJves the f911Qwing features:
1) Noi::ice of accusation and of the evidence against the accused'

inmate;
· ·
2) An opportunity to r.ebut the evidence presented;
163See Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp: 544 (W.D. Wis. i972), rev'd, 1~ GRIM. L. REP.
2378 (7th Cir., Jan. 17, 1973).
·
164Seeid. at 544-45.
1G5Jd. at 553-54; see Note, Priscm Mail Censorship and the First Amendment, ·81 YALE
L.J. 87, 108-11 (1971).
,
.
.
·166 Colen v. Norton, 10 CruM:.L. REP. :2358 (D.C. Conn: 1972).
· 167 Cluchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 781-85 (N.D. Chl. 197i).
168Jd. at 784-85.
169 McGinnis v. Royster, 332 F. Supp. 973 (S.D;N.Y. 1971), iev'd, 410 U.S. 263 (1973).
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3) A hearing before a person not directly involved in the alleged
incident of misconduct; and
4) A written decision.170
Such a fact :finding process would better serve its purposes of legitimiz-

,ing the imposition of a prison sanction if its scope were defined by a
limitation on the power of the prison to promulgate disciplinary rules.
The potential for such a limitation was ignored when one of the many
courts which engaged in rudimentary due process analysis held that the
presence of counsel is required at a prison disciplinary hearing whenever
the alleged offending conduct also could lead to a criminal prosecution. 171
The_ court also required adequate notice, cross examination of adverse
witnesses, a decision based on submitted evidence, a decision by an unbiased fact finder, and a right to appeal to afford the inmate due process.172 The court should have analyzed the issue in terms of the competence of the prison disciplinary hearing to adjudicate conduct that might
lead to the imposition of another prison term. The proposed analysis sugg~ that an aggravated assault on a prison guard should not be treated
as a violation of a prison rule, but rather that the regular criminal process
should be invoked. The court should have enjoined the prison from conducting any disciplinary proceeding and_ ordered a speedy trial for the
inmate. Had this approach been taken, the judiciary could have developed a_rule for allocating decision making which recognized that the
adjudication of criminality is a judicial function.
In .general, the existing rudimentary due process analysis of prison discipliPary hearings should be viewed in terms of allocating decision making. So viewed, administrative review of the prison's imposition of sanctions also should be required. If each prison has its own disciplinary rules
and process of determining violations, the right to appeal to the department of corrections further legitimizes prison decisions. Overall penal
policies in a given jurisdiction would be developed by the department
and applied in its review of prison decisions. These policies should be
explicitly articulated, and the department should be required to give
written reasons for its approval or modifications of prison decisions. For
170 See Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 653-54 (E.D. Va. 1971); Clu!=hettc v.
·Piocunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 7Bl-85 (ND·. Cal. 1971):
171 See Cluchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 783 (N.D. Cal. 1971). Alternatives to
requiring the presence of lawyers should be considered in selecting the means to protect
.inmates' rights. Compare Hooks v. Wainwright, 352 F. Supp. 163 (MD. Fla. 1972) with
Cluchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (ND. Cal. 1971). A "lay advocate" or law
student could be used as a decision maker in the criminal law for some purposes. Cf.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (Brennan, J.; concurring); Johnson v.
Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 491 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring) •
. "1'12.328 F. Supp. at 782-84. · .
· ·
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instance, a department of corrections might approve a prison's hearing
procedures which were modeled on the mediation method of resolving
disputes. An articulation of the reasons for a department's approval of
such a procedure in terms of overall policy also would increase the likelihood of judicial approval if the procedure were questioned by any inmate.173
Judicial review would be necessary to correct possible mistakes of the
prison fact .finding process. The scope of judicial review should be limited to review of the decisions and the rules enunciated by the department of corrections. However, the judiciary also might have to intervene to protect constitutional rights by directing that an individual's conduct be adjudicated either through the regular criminal process or the
intra-prison disciplinary process. Ideally the courts should intervene to
determine the proper forum before any adjudication takes place; however, this intervention more likely will be an after-the-fact determination
that the individual was properly or improperly processed. The litigable
issues before the courts increasingly should become whether the factmil
determination was supported-by the evidence and whether the processes
of promulgation and adjudication conform to the purposes of intra-prison
disposition.
·

Limits on the Nature of Disposition.

The process of delineating
the scope of sanctions prison officials may impose already has begun under existing analysis. The use of corporal punishnient,. other forms·. :of
physical abuse,174 and overly restrictive diets175 have been declared ·np.l..
permissible dispositions for the violation of prison disciplinary rules. The
total control exercised over the individual by the prison· instittition requires a careful delineation of· sanctions. The use of segregation as a
sanction for violating a prison rule against ~ssault may. be. permissible,
but the denial of medical care w_hile in solitary may not be. The loss of
recreational privileges or work privileges may be appropriate for lesser
violations such as possession of contraband 'Or theft of prison property
or the property of other inmates. Given· the broad scope for the promuJgation of rules by the institutions and the nature of intra-prison adjudication, the dispositional devices available to correctional officials should be
limited. Wide discretion in the maximum and miriimum number of days
in solitary confinement would tend to le~d to arbitrary use of official
state power. The process of promulgation properly should includ~ con173 See Note, Bargaining in Co"ectional lnstitu,tions: ReStrUcturing the Relation Between the hnnate and the Prison Authority, 81 YALE L.J. 726, 729-34 (1972).
174See Jackson v. Bishop; 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir.1968).
175 See. Landman v.Royster, 333}f. Supp. 621,627-28 (E.D. Va.1971).
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sideration of whether mandatory penalty schemes for an intra-prison
.discipline system would tend to promote more rational dispositions.176
THE DECISION TO RELEASE ON PAROLE

The existing analysis of parole decisions should be redefined in terms
,of allqcating decision making responsibility between the judiciary and
what is in effect another criminal adminiStrative agency in order to develop standards for parole decisions. The judiciary should require some
standards for parole board decision making since the status of parole is a
form of conditional liberty that all inmates are presumed to prefer to
incarceration. Under the proposed analysis, the development of standards for these decisions involves drawing distinctions that effectuate the
fundamental interesi: in a concept of liberty. Although the existing approach permits an inmate to seek judicial review of a denial of parole,177
it fails to provide standards for either the parole decisions or judicial review to determine which denials are arbitrary.
In articulating standards for review, the courts should recognize that
some legitimate considerations in parole decision making may differentiate it significantly from judicial decision making. First, the particular
nature of the legislative mandate to the parole board will influence the
kinds of standards that are developed. Second, the courts must take into
consideration the particular agency that will administer the standards
·promulgated by the court to achieve its goals. Thus, the standards applied to a criminal administrative agency in its choice of penal policy
should be less restrictive than those applicable to a trial judge at sentencing. Third, the courts should recognize that their role essentially is
one of review, so that their decision not only affects the outcome of the
particular case under review but also encourages a particular decision
making policy by the parole board.
The actual wording of the typical legislative mandate to a parole
board provides little guidance to the parole board in its decision to grant
or deny parole. The statute usually prohibits the use of certain criteria
. for granting parole, such as good conduct, unless the board believes the
convict will become a law-abiding citizen on release.178 Despite the
176 Cf. AMEruCAN FRIENDs SERVICE CoMMITIEE,
177 See' Monks v. New Jersey State Parole Bd.,

STRUGGLE FOR JusnCE 147-48 (1971).
58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193 (1971). The
parole board may even be required to give written reasons for a denial. ld. at 246-49,
277 A.2d at 197-99.
. ·178 A typical statute provides that:
No prisoner shall be released on parole merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties assigned while under sentence, but
only if the board is of the opinion th'<lt there is reasonable probability that,
if such prisoner is released, he will assume his proper ana rightful place in
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statute's failure to provide criteria for the denial of parole, the courts
could interpret the statutory scheme as mandating that parole board
decision making consist of a risk analysis of the likelihood that an indj.:.
vidual will or will not violate the criminal law if released. 179 A legislative
mandate of a decision based on risk analysis means that the parole board
rather than the judiciary should be the principal decision maker. The
court's influence on the standards that the board might develop should
be limited to requiring that the denials not be arbitrary. In effect this
becomes a requirement that the denial should be rational in terms of the
purposes of parole. Given the present uncertainty as to the purposes of
parole, however, the reviewing court should approve the board's decision
so long as some purpose has been articulated and made the basis for the
grant or denial of parole.
The board should be free to choose between the penal policies of ·restraint, reform, rehabilitation, or reintegration in articulating the purp<;>se
of parole which underlies its decisions. While the terminology used- to
describe the various policies is borrowed from the disciplines of criminology and penology, these policies are essentially different perspectives
on the broad purposes of state confinement and correction process generally.180 The terminology's utility to the development of legal standards
is that the variety of policies represents different views of the necessity
of incarceration to achieve the particular purpose of state control deemed
appropriate. A board, for instance, might adopt the policy of restraipt
for those confined in maximum security institutions and the policy of
reintegration for those confined in minimum security institutions. Under
the proposed analysis a reviewing court should give effect to the board's
differentiation in its determination that a denial was or was not rational.
However, the tentative decision as to the appropriate penal policy is for
the parole board.181
society, without violation of the law, and that his release is not incompatible
with the welfare of society.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.14 (1964); see D. Glaser and V. O'Leary, Dept. of H.E.W.,
Personal Characteristics and Parole Outcome (1966) (sociological survey of personal
characteristics as they relate t() parole outcome; a "handy" booklet for the decision
maker, but one which fails to refer to ·criteria as being legally permissible).
179 Since the board is a criminal administrative agency, it should restrict its analysis
to the likelihood of violations of the criminal law rather than the mores of society in
general.
180 See Duffee & O'Leary, Models of Correction: An Entry in the Packer-Gritfiths
Debate, 7 CruM. L. BULL, 329, 339-45 (1972).
181 Since the choice of penal policy may determine the rationality of parole denials,
an understanding of the similarities and differences between th"e £our possible policies
is vital. All four policies permit the parole board to engage in the kind of risk analysis
that is prescribed by the legislature. However, the policies of restraint and reform place
greater emphasis in decision making on the social interest in controllipg the individual
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:_ After the parole board has chosen a policy, the crjteria it should consider· in denying or granting parole are the J;otality of the inmate's criminal conduct, the psychiatric or other penological evaluation, and the in·dividual's intra-prison discipline record.l82 The importance of any one
factor will vary with the particular policy chosen by the board. The
totality of the inmate's criminal conduct should be considered since the
legislative mandate directs the parole board to judge the individual's risk
of recidivism. For the purposes of parole decision making past conduct
can be used as a factor in determining the risk of future misconduct.133
Psychiatric or other e~ert evaluations are relevant because the parole
decision is essentially a predictive judgment about future human behavior. These expert opinions, while not determinative, clearly merit
consideration. The individual's intra-prison record is a permissible criteria
only if the intra-prison discipline process operates under the previously
suggested methods. The disciplinary record is relevant in that the inmate's ability io conform his behavior to a system of rules within the
state incarceration process might aid in predicting his ability to conform
to the rules in the larger community.
The judiciary should review parole denials in such a manner as to encourage parole boards to use the three above mentioned factors in their
decisions. To some extent this could be accomplished if reviewing courts
offender than do rehabilitation and reintegration. The penal policy of restraint would
lead to parole decisions that emphasized the community's attitude towards the violator
and parole would be granted only to those deemed acceptable to the community. Duffee
& O'Leary, supra note 180, at 344.
The policy of reform similarly emphasizes community attitudes, but a board operating
under such a policy would look to the inmate to see if he evidences that he has adopted
community norms while incarcerated. Id. at 341. The risk analysis dictated by a policy
of ref.orm would seek to ascertain a convergence of individual and community values.
Such an analysis probably would lead to an inquiry into whether an inmate is likely to
lead a productive life rather than whether he will violate the criminal law, Id. at 340.
The other two possible policies-rehabilitation and reintegration-both place great emphasis on the particular characteristics of the individual. A board committed to rehabilitation would focus on the issue of the inmate's response to the institution's program
of treatment. Id. at 343. Such treatment programs might involve either institutional worlc
programs or psychotherapy. The board also would rely on medical or psychological
evaluations of the inmate. Once the program· of treatment was completed the individual
would be released. The policy of reintegration would seek to restore the inmate to
.the larger community through the·use of as many resources as possible in the outside
community. A board adopting reintegration as the guiding policy for its decisions
would rely as much as possible on social processes within the larger community to
prevent future breaches o£ the criminal law. Such reliance in .some cases might require
a decision to release without any 5pecific evidence of the efficacy of social processes
to prevent future criminal. behavior for the particular individual involved.
• 182 These factors reflect' all four penal policies and provide inputs from the various
·institutions that influence parole decision malcing.
· 183. The statute inay also 'suggest these criteria. See note 178 supra.
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explicitly- ·delineated the crite~ia which cannot influence a· decision to
deny parole. Such factors as ..the inmate's employment prospects,- tinie
served, and extent of participation in institutional programs, for example,
should not be considered. Using the inmate's lack of employment prospects as a reason for denying par{)le would violate the overall goal of
diminishing the in:fluence of an individual's economic status on the outcome of criminal decision making:184 Consideration of the length of time
served tends to multiply the effect of the prior determination to incarcerate on the subsequent parole decision involving individual liberty:~
The time served simply is reflective of sentencing policy, and the board
instead should look to the nature of the criminal conduct. which. led to
the decision to incarcerate. Finally, consideration of the lack of participation by the inmate in non-mandatory institutional programs as a factor
in denial of parole compels the individual to cooperate with the state
incarceration process without articulating any specification of a reason
for the compulsion.
Clearly, however, factors which may not be used to deny parole may
be relevant to a decision to grant it. Under any of the various penal
policies, a board could justify the parole of an individual who has been
active in voluntary institutional programs, has served a long period of
incarceration, {)r has a job awaiting his release. Nothing suggested her~
should prevent an individual from presenting these factors as evidence
to the parole board to justify release. The proposed analysis, however,
focuses on those decisions that interfere with individual liberty and thus
is concerned only with denials of parole.
·,
The reviewing court can encourage .the board to use the proper factors
in making parole decisions by clearly articulating the court's own view
of "rationality." Thus, the court can encourage the board to choose
proper penal policies by making clear that a particular decision may b~
rational under one policy but irrational, and therefore subject to reverfial~
if another has been chosen. Perhaps the only absolute limitation on the
board's freedom of choice, however, is that all individuals within one
institution must be deemed to be under the same policy. The court also
can encourage the parole board and the legislature to improve decision
making by adopting a rebuttable presumption on review in favor of
parole, regardless of the policy chosen by the board. The court then
should hold that, in the absence of evidence to explain the result in terms
of the board's stated policy, a denial of parole is improper. Such a standard allows for review based on evidence in the record to justify the denial.
In most ·caseS, if proper criteria are used and some_ evi<;l~nc;e is p.t;esent,
184 See

note 44 supra and accompanying text."
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most denials will be upheld since the estimation of the risks involved in
the individual case is essentially a parole board decision.185
PART Ill

DISPOSITIONAL CRITERIA FOR AUTHORIZED DISPOSITIONS TO
AvoiD THE CRIMINAL REsuLT

Legislatures have authorized confinement processes that purport to
reform or rehabilitate individuals brought into the criminal process. In
one category of cases the legislatures have adopted a "medical model"
for the civil confinement of persons deemed in need of treatment in order
to function properly in society.186 In another category of cases, a legislature has provided special dispositions to reform or rehabilitate individuals
with a particular social status.187 Criteria for commitment must be developed that both protect the individual from arbitrary state control and
promote greater understanding of human behavior within these confinement processes.
CONCEPTS OF LffiERTY IN CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCESSES

The first category "Of cases includes various forms of civil commitment,
accompanied by a myriad of articulated rationales.188 These civil commitment processes recently have come under scrutiny by the Supreme
185 Whether a parole board must constitutionally give a reason for a denial is not
discussed. See Scarpa v. United States Parole Bd., 13 GRIM. L. RPm. 2138 (5th Cir. Apr.
2, 1973) (en bane); Beckworth v. Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 301 A.2d 729 (1973).
186 See generally Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: "A Knife that Cms
Both Ways," 51 JUDICATURE 370 (1968).
187D.C. ConE ANN. § 24-601 to -615 (1967). As both types of compulsory state confinement processes have come under judicial scrutiny, the lack of expertise and resources
at these special institutions has become clear. See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C.
Cir.1966).
188 Consider the Supreme Court's perhaps belated realization of. the problem:
The States have traditionally exercised broad power to commit persons
found to be mentally ill. The substantive limitations on the exercise of this
power and the procedures for invoking it vary drastically among the States.
The particular fashion in which the power is exercised-for instance through
various forms of civil commitment, defective delinquency laws, sexual psychopath laws, commitment of persons acquitted by reason of insanityreflects different combinations of distinct bases for commitment sought to
be vindicated. The bases that have been articulated include dangerousness to
self~ dangerousness to others, and the need for care or treatment or training.
Considering the number of persons affected, it is perhaps remarltable that
the substantive constitutional limitations on this power have not been more
frequently litigated.
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 736-37 (1972).
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Court in a trilogy of .cases involving a sexual psychopath statute,l89 ·a
· commitment on grounds of. incompetency to stand trial, 190 and a confinement pursuant to a ·defective delinquent statute.191 The Court did
.not invalidate any of the three statutory sche111es. However, employing
fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection analysis, the
Court articulated three principles which the judiciary must apply to confinement. First, the individual must be given an opportunity to adjudicate
whether the legislature is making irrational and arbitrary distinctions between individuals convicted of crimes and those not convicted of crimes.
Second, the nature of confinement must bear some relationship to the
purpose of confinement. Third, the duration of confinement must be
related to progress toward the purpose of confinement to prevent an indefirtite life term under the fiction that treatment is continuing but has
not yet succeeded.
·.
Humphrey v. Cady 192 involved a broad constitutional attack on a state
sex crime act by means of a federal habeas corpus petition. The district
court had dismissed the petition, but the Supreme Court held that the
petitioner was entided to an evidentiary hearing on whether his recommitment to a sexual psychopath institution was invalid because the commitment of other allegedly mentally ill persons had been determined
by a jury.193 Without deciding whether a jury determination is appropriate in the commitment p;rocess, the effect of the decision is to allow
individuals greater ability to adjudicate the constitutionality of legislatively-created classi.ficatipns. A prior decision had required that a mentally ill person convicted of a crime must be committed through the
same processes as a non-criminal mentally ill person. 194 Humphrey allows an individual ~o adjudicate whether the legislature can make distinctions based on the symptQmatology Qf the allegedly mentally ill individual since the sex crimes commitment procedure existed solely for
those convicted of certain types of crimes.l95
.
196
Jackson v. Indiana not only established· that the nature of confinement must bear some relation to the purpose of confinement, but also
demonstrated that due process principles are not limited in application
to dispositional processes which follow an adjudication of criminality.
189 Humphreyv. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
190 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
191 McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution,
192 405
504 (1972).

u.s.

407 U.S. 245 (1972).
.

193[d. at 508.
•
194 See Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 109 (1966);
195See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972);

(1967).
196 406 u.s. 715 (1972).

cf. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S .. 605
.
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In I ackson the Court invalidated the confinement of an individual who
had been charged with a crime but who was declared incompetent to
.stand trial. The case questions directly the power of the state to confine
.an individual without any "due process" adjudication of his conduct.
The dilemma in I ackson was that the state did not want to proceed
criminally against the accused because of his inability to participate in
an adjudicatory process. A substantial possibility existed that the individual would never be able to understand the legal proceedings/97 and
the Court left it to the state either to determine if the individual would
.be able to understand the proceedings in the foreseeable future or to
seek some form of civil commitment.198
Were the state to seek civil commitment upon remand, the Jackson
decision required it to explore the possibility of commitment under the
general civil commitment statute as well as the commitment procedures
.for those alleged to be feeble-minded. 199 Apparently, under the Hum.Phrey rationale, Jackson's attorney would be entitled to argue for com. mitment under the statutory scheme with the most liberal release standards or with the least stringent confinement process.200 Were Jackson
found incompetent to stand trial, some aspects of the criminal process
such as motions for pretrial dismissal of the indictment might occur.201
The possibility existed that the allegation of Jackson's criminal conduct
never would be adjudicated within the criminal process.202 If Jackson
were confined under these circumstances, his disposition would not be
criminal.203
Finally, McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution 204 held that it is a
denial of due process to indefinitely confine a petitioner on the basis of
an ex parte order committing him merely for observation; the term of
confinement must be related to the purpose for which the individual was
committed.205 Following a criminal conviction and prior to the expira197 Jackson apparendy was a 27 year old deaf mute who was unable to read or write.
One doctor even had suggested that petitioner was unable to communicate in sign
language.Id. at 719.
· 198ld. at 739-41.
199]d. at 728 n.6.
. 200 See notes 192-195 supra and accompanying text.
201406 U.S. at 740-41.
202 Jackson's right to a speedy trial under the sixth amendment specifically was not
decided by the Court. I d. at 740.
203 The discussion assumes that Jackson is in need of some form of state confinement.
Nothing should prevent Jackson's counsel from showing that no state confinement process
is appropriate because Jackson is untreatable and is not in need of custodial care. See
Burt & Morris, A Proposal For the Abolition of the Incompetency Plea, 40 U. CHI. L.
REv. 66, 70 (1972). .

u.s. 245 (1972).

204 407
205]d. at

250.
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cion of.his sentence, McNeil was sent to an institution for "defective
delinquents" for an examination206 to determine whether the -officials at
the institution should seek judicial commitment of him as a defective
delinquent. One year after the expiration of his original!lentence, McNeil
still had not been brought before a judge to determine if he was in fact
a defective delinquent. The Supreme Court relied on ] ackson v. Indiana
to invalidate his continued confinement on the grounds that the officials
at the institution in effect had changed the purpose of his confinement
from observation and examination to simple confinement.207
In a companion case, the Court dismissed its grant of certiorari in a
case directly questioning the scope and purpose of the defective delinquent dispositional process as defined by the legislature.208 Some of
the individuals involved weJ;e entitled to some relief under existing law,
while the others would have an opportunity to demonstrate eligibility
for more stringent commitment standards and more liberal release provisions for individuals not convicted of crimes under the principles established in] ackson and Humphrey .209 More importantly, the court invited
the state legislature to reconsider its entire compulsory· confinement
process in light of the court's recently developed principles. 2 ~ 0
SPECIAL DISPOSITIONS BASED ON.SOCIAL STATUS

In another category of cases legislatures have authorized special dispositions which only can be rationalized in terms of the social status of
the individuals selected for these special processes. For example, in establishing a system of dispositions under the Federal Youth Corrections
Act, 211 Congress has assumed that a youth convicted of a crime is in need
of specialized disposition because of his age.212 Likewise, indeterminate
sentences for women who commit the same offense for which men receive definite terms represent similar legislative assumptions about the
causes -of female crime that justify specialized dispositions. The notion
206 See Mo. ANN. ConE art. 31B, §§ S,9(b) (1971).
207 407 U.S. at 249-50. The Court specifically did not reach McNeil's claim that his
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination had been violated by the effect
given to his refusal to submit to psychiatric and psychological testing. To have invalidated
the commitment on fifth amendment grounds would have required the Court to define
the scope of an individual's right not to cooperate with a dispositional process which
requires him to cooperate in receiving treatment.·Whether the state may use the contempt power to force the individual to submit to the examination likewise was not
decided by the Court. Set; id. at 250-51.
.
208 See Murel v. Baltimore City Grim. Ct., 407 U.S. 355 (1972).
209 Cf. id. at 357-58.
210 Id. at 358.
21118 u.s.c. §§ 5005-26 (1970).
212 See id. § SOlO (sentencing).
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of a family offense that is adjudicated and disposed of outside the criminal process is based on conceptions of how both the assaulter and the
victim view the conduct because of their social status as members of the
same family unit.
Three fundamental issues are presented by these specialized dispositional schemes. If the legislature is allowed to assume that an individual
adjudged guilty of a crime is entided to a special form of disposition, the
question arises whether the discretion of other dispositional officials must
be restric~ed or expanded. Second, if the social status of the individual
presents a legal basis for the state intervention and, upon a proper adjudication, state control, the issue then becomes whether the whole process
of criminal adjudication should be avoided. If the criminal process is
avoided, then rational criteria should be developed both in terms of the
reasons for diverting individuals from the criminal process and the purpose of the state processes in which the individual finds himself. Third,
while the criminal dispositional processes might be utilized to promo~e
a concept of individual liberty, the differentiation of dispositional processes on the basis of an individual's social status raises the issue of the
limits on processes which seek to promote a societal definition of the
individual.
Indefinite commitments for wo~en offenders and for youthful offenders into adulthood213 present the issue of the need to expand or contract the discretion of other dispositional officials to achieve the legislative goal. Judicial response in the case of youthful offenders has been to
limit the discretion of judges and correctional officials to further the
legislative goal. The courts apparendy are sympathetic to the legislative
view that when the criminal offender is young, he is presumptively a
candidate for reform. The judicial response to indeterminate terms for
women without legally mandated parole eligibility reflects the increasingly questionable status of legal distinctions based on sex. The court in
Commonwealth v. Daniels214 viewed the evil in indeterminate sentencing
for women to be the lack of trial judge discretion to "individualize" the
sentence.215 Although _the court invalidated the scheme on the basis that
there was no rational basis for the distinction in sentencing based on sex,
the court seemingly desired only to replace board discretion i.vith discretion in the trial judge.
Without considering the broader implications of sex as a basis for a
213See id.
214 430 Pa.
215 I d.

642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968).
at 647, 243 A.2d at 403.
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legal distinction, a better approach to the sentencing scheme is to require that the state bear the burden of jus!lfying a separate sentencing
scheme for women. Such a. requirement forces the dispositional officials
to present to the judiciary a. credible penal policy and evidence to justify
it before the court passes on the validity of the legislative judgment that
women should be sentenced differently than men. In addition, the requirement also allows the dispositional officials to demonstrate to the
judiciary that good faith efforts a.re being made toward achieving the
penal goals set by the legislature.216
The criteria developed for special dispositional processes might be
modeled on those adopted for the Federal Youth Correction Act by the
District of Columbia courts,217 where the correctional officials have become part of the sentencing process under a four step procedure.218 An
individual within the statutory age limits is presumptively a candidate
for the specialized disposition unless the judge can show that the youth
is not a fit subject for special sentencing.219 On the basis of the presumption, the judge must order a 60 day study to see if the individual is, in
the opinion of his future custodians, a fit subject for the specialized disposition. Next, the correctional officials must present their plan of treatment and establish the period of confinement necessary. Finally, the
court must be furnished with certification that adequate space in an appropriate facility exists for the individual. The apparent impetus for these
procedures was the lack of adequate facilities in the District of Columbia.
The court went funher and directed the utilization of other federal facilities throughout the country.220
Before individuals are placed in specialized facilities, the dispositional
criteria must seek to insure that the facilities can make at least a good
faith effort toward their legislatively prescribed goals of disposition. The
effect of the process developed in the District of Columbia may be to
have some young persons incarcerated in reformatories or penitentiaries.
A more important aspect of the procedures is to question whether officials given a. special dispositional function have the resources to achieve
their goals. Until the courts invalidate the specialized dispositions for
youths as they already have begun to do for women, the judicially developed procedures a.re necessary to insure that the specialized processes
21GSee State v. Chambers, 68 N.J. 287, 307 A.2d 78 (1973); State v. Costello, 59 N.J.
334, 282 A.2d 748 (1971).
217 See United States v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973 (DD.C. 1971).
218 Id. at 979-80.
219 See United States v. Waters, 437 F.2d 722,724 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
220 336 F. Supp. at 981.
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are administered in such a manner as to protect a concept of individual
liberty within the legislatively defined dispositional goals.221
Even where the legislature substitutes non-criminal processes for crim..:
inal adjudication, the state processes still must be administered to protect
an individual from the arbitrary exercise of state power. The Family Offense Act of New York provides for the transfer of certain cases of
simple assault between members of a family to family court.222 In exercising its discretion to hear a case, however, the family court must employ criteria which prevent one family member from forcing another
into the more coercive criminal process. Thus, due process might be
violated if family court jurisdiction were based solely on whether the
victim of the alleged assault wanted reconciliation.223
More importantly, the Act recognizes the potential for resolving conflicts in non-criminal institutions and for restoring social order without
utilizing the criminal processes of adjudication and disposition.224 Family
court processes, unlike criminal adjudications, view the alleged assaulter
in the context of a social function-father, husband, wife, or mother.
The assumption behind the Family Offense Act could lead to a generally
different view of criminal disposition if a family model of the criminal
process were adopted. If the presumption of reconciliation between the
victim and perpetrator of the crime of the family offense scheme is carried over into the criminal context, a criminal process could be built on
the assumption of ultimate reconcilability of interest between the state
and the individual accused and convicted of the crime.225 Rather than
assuming that a new type of criminal process can be achieved solely
through ideological innovation, the family offense scheme does serve as
a reminder that societal goals in implementing criminal processes do not
dictate necessarily that the most coercive forms of state control be employed. If restoring the social order in terms of the individual offender
and the state is what is meant by reform or rehabilitation, the dispositional policy maker will have to consider the ability of society to reestablish its norms without criminal disposition.
221 But see

United States v. Lowery, 335 F. Supp. 519 (DD.C. 1971).
Act provides in part: "The family court has exclusive original jurisdiction •• ,
over any proceeding concerning acts which would constitute disorderly conduct, harassment, menacing, reckless endangerment, an assault or an attempted assault between
spouses or between parent and child or between members of the same family or household." N.Y. FAMILY CoURT Acr § 812 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
223 See In re Montalvo v. Montalvo, 55 Misc. 2d 699, 286 N.Y.S.2d 605 (Family Ct.
1968).
224See People v. Allen, 27 N.Y.2d 108,:261 N.E.2d 637, 313 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1970).
225 See Griffiths, supra note 32, at 373.
222 The
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IV

A SuMMARY AND SoME UNANSWERED QUEsTIONS
The proposed analysis would replace official discretion at sentencing
with judicially created standards for sentencing officials. No single legal
standard can replace the doctrine of official discretion since sentencing
involves a variety of officials with different legal functions. As demonstrated in this article these officials are judges, administrators, and legislators. Since sentencing is viewed more broadly as a form of legal decision making, it is possible to summarize the recommended standards
and acknowledge the unanswered questions in terms of the officials engaged in sentencing.
JUDICIARY

Assuming that the legislature has established a maximum and minimum
range of dispositions upon conviction,226 four problem areas have been
delineated as appropriate for appellate rather than trial judge decision
making.

Incarceration versus N on-incttrceration.

Appellate courts should
employ an interest analysis to develop dispositional policy to guide the
decision to grant or withhold probation. If the interest at stake in dispositional policy is the concept of individual liberty, there should be a
presumption favoring-the grant of probation at sentencing. If the interest
is that of protecting the state processes, the trial ju~ge presumptively
should sentence the offender to some period of incarceration.227 Narrowly drawn secondary rules might be developed to mitigate or aggravate
the sentence when the primary decision is probation or -incarceration.228
Appellate courts can use a system of primary a~d secondary rules to explain the differences in sentences in tenns of overall dispositional policy.
Furthermore, the system of articulated appellate rules will guide trial
judge decisions in cases which will not require appellate review.

Use of Prior Convictions -in Trial Judge Sentencing.
The recommended use of prior convictions at sentencing demonstrates how a
226 It should be noted that even in the California system, the decision to incarcerate
could be governed by rules of disposition. See In re Minnis, 7 Cal. 3d 639, 498 P.2d 997,
102 Cal. Rptr. 749 (i972). ·- ·.
227 The article does not discuss the crimes against private property and bodily securitj
directly. The basic analysis could be used to develop iules for probation. However,
with so many crimes in these broad categories the analysis might be more crime-specific.
For instance, probation might be appropriate for simple assault but not for aggravated
assault.
228 See D. THoMAs, PRINCIPLES oF SEN1ENCING 35-70.
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system of articulated rules can change present practice. The use of prior
convictions to enhance the disposition of an individual should be eliminated. However, an individual should be allowed to use the lack of prior
convictions as a secondary rule of mitigation. Thus, where the primary
decision already has been made in favor of incarceration, the individual
should be able to argue to the trial judge and to the appellate court that
he should not receive the maximum penalty because of the lack of prior
convictions. H some decision maker is to assume that the prior convictions are evidence of individual dangerousness, the legislature must establish the appropriate system of disposition for such individuals.229

Multiple Sentences.
An interest analysis should be used when
individuals have been convicted under a multiple-count indictment. A
single general sentence is the recommended disposition where multiple
counts represent violations of one particular interest of the criminal
law.2ao
Privilege of Non-Cooperation.
A major purpose of sentencing
rules is to clarify whether a particular dispositional policy interferes with
an individual's right of non-cooperation. By construing rules so that they
do not infringe on the individual's right not to cooperate with state
processes, the courts can use sentencing rules to influence the conduct
of other officials in the criminal law process. Although this article has
not attempted to define the scope of the .fifth amendment privilege at
sentencing, the analysis has demonstrated that the issue of non-cooperation is part of dispositional decision making. 231
Some Unanswered Questions.
In what might be called the
"process" aspects of the model, at least two types of questions remain
unresolved. Assuming that some of the broad policy decisions recommended were adopted by an appellate court, the nature of the hearing
which takes place before the sentencing judge still must be delineated.
The adversary notion of adjudication is not necessarily required since
the model assumes a distinction between criminal adjudication and criminal disposition. Nor is the standard of proof used in criminal adjudicaSee note 110 supra and accompanying text.
article has not discussed the problems of the defendant charged with crimes
in two or more jurisdictions and how that individual should be handled in the legal
system. Whether there should be rules of disposition to govern this case as there arc
rules of adjudication is not discussed. Cf. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969) (state
with a pending charge against an individual is required to provide a speedy trial upon
demand).
231 See Williams v. United States, 295 A.2d 503 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972).
229

230 The

1973]

SENTENCING

55

cion appropriate for dispositional decision making.232 The form of a
sentencing hearing might depend upon further exploration of whether
disclosure of all or portions of the pre-sentence reports is required.
Furthermore, if one of the rules of sentencing has been violated by a
trial judge, the issue of whether the appellate court should mandate the
appropriate sentence or remand for resentencing has not been resolved.
The choice between the two courses of action might depend upon the
nature of the particular rule violated or whether the appellate court has
the pre-sentence report as part of the record on appeal.
The model has left vast areas of the substance of rules of disposition
unexplored. The secondary principles, particularly those that should
govern the length of incarceration within the statutory maximum, have
not been discussed. 233 However, the analysis suggests that appellate rule
malcing must consider what the judiciary has done or should do to the
correction process. In addition, the court should consider what new alternatives to incarceration the legislature may have created. Were an appellate court willing to adopt a new policy for disposition, the question
of the retroactivity of the new rule would have to be resolved. Under the
analysis offered, however, the court would not be bound by the constitutional doctrines of retroactivity developed for adjudication.234
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

While the role of the judiciary in the correction process recendy has
increased, instances of judicial intervention would be rare if administrative decisions were guided by creative judicial decision making. The responsibility could be shifted back to the criminal administrative agencies
without diminishing the importance of a concept of individual liberty
within the state confinement processes.
232 Justice Douglas, who dissented in Murel, cited In re Winship and suggested that
the burden of proof necessary to commit under the Maryland statute should be proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Murel v. Baltimore City Crim. Ct., 407 U.S. 355, 359-65
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). But to the
degree that the majority opinion in Winship established proof beyond a reasonable
doubt because that standard of proof gave f.oundation to the presumption of innocence,
Justice Douglas' analysis of Winship is faulty. If the use of the defective delinquent
statute assumes a valid conviction, meaning the presumption of innocence has been overcome, why protect that presumption at disposition? This is not to suggest that the commitment standards of the defective delinquent statutes may not be invalid for other
reasons, nor is it meant to suggest the problems of appropriate standards o£ proof for
disposition generally have been resolved.
.
233 See People v. Tanner, 387 Mich. 683, 199 ~.W.2d 202 (1972).
234See Michigan v. Payne, 41 U.S.L.W. 4671 (U.S. May 21, 1973) (North Carolina v.
Pearce held not retroactive).
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Intra-Prison Discipline.

A court should require that the system
of intra-prison discipline proposed in this article be adopted. A statewide department of corrections could provide appellate review for each
institution's disciplinary system. Each institution, however, should be
required to establish its own rules so that the intra-prison system could
perform a socializing 'function when infractions occur. As a reviewing
agency of the first instance, the department may be able to correct abuses
of individual officials in given cases and review challenges to the rules
themselves. The role of courts would be somewhat more limited. The
courts would review the operation of the total system and the rules to
correct improper interferences with an individual's liberty.

Parole Bom·d Decisions to Deny Release.
Judicial review of parole decision making should encourage the development of rational criteria for denial of parole. The decision to deny parole could be justified
in terms of the totality of the individual's criminal conduct, his record
of intra-prison disciplinary action, and the psychiatric or other expert
prognosis of parole success or failure. The interjection of a concept of
individual liberty into this decision making process justifies a more active
judicial role than with other administrative agencies. The criteria used
by the board are not the only important considerations for review by the
judiciary; the process by which cases are decided-particularly doubtful cases-is of equal importance. The courts should not force any particular view of the correction process upon parole boards, but rather
must emphasize the law's concern that the concept of individual liberty
be maximized in deciding doubtful cases.
Some Unanswered Questions.

The limitations proposed on administrative criminal discretion do not require that every decision within
the correction process be conducted in accordance with the analysis
suggested. For instance, a decision refusing to grant the status of work
release might not be cognizable by the judiciary. Judicial review might
tend to destroy the use of a risk analysis in the selection of inmates who
merit work release, and a judicial requirement of written reasons for the
denial and criteria for the decision may be unwise. The state-wide department of corrections, however, may be justified in reviewing the
denial under limited conditions. If, for instance, the state-wide department were trying to determine what types ·of individuals were successful
on work release, review of the institutional decisions might be a means
of gathering information.
Similarly, the question might arise whether work release status, once
granted, can be revoked without reasons or without standards for the
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decision. If judicial review of this rev-ocation were viewed as interfering
with the type of risk analysis legislatively mandated in the original decision to grant work release, such review should not ·be undertakenl
When the decision is alleged to be on impermissible grounds, such as the
religious practices of certain inmates, the judiciary may be required to
review the particular decision in order to protect -one of .the individual's
cognizable rights.
A constitutional analysis cannot address all the issues surrounding parole denials. Other kinds of rules based on the various policies should be
developed to determine the circumstances under which a refusal to submit to a psychiatric diagnosis can justify a denial -of parole.235 Similarly,
some standards for determining the reliability of the information used
by the parole board should be developed. 236 These standards must be designed to control the work of officials who prepared the reports.
ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE

The major role for the legislatures under the model of criminal dis~
position is to develop alternatives to present dispositions. The .first challenge to the legislature is to _reconstruct the variety 9f civil commitment
processes to conform to the notions -of protecting individual liberty already promulgated by the judiciary.
.
A second challenge to the legislatures willing to accept the view tha~
criminal dispositions have .limited utility is to consider establishing dispositions that use the resources of the larger society. A program to establish some community-based institutions· for certain legislatively defined
groups of individuals is ripe for legislative consideration under the model's
assumptions. The model's usefulness to a legislature considering new pro-,
posals is the emphasis placed on establishing appropriate criteria in the
definition of the group that might qualify for disposition under commuri~
ity-based programs or new alternatives of lesser forms of state contiol.23~
Whether the legislature should concern itself with modifying the judi~
cial rules of disposition which are n-ot of constitutional dimension-depends
upon one's view of the efficacy of the legislative process. My own view
is that were the legislature dissatisfied with any specific judicial rule of
disposition, it would have to reconsider the nature of the substantive of..:
235 See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 241, 252 (Douglas, J., con'curring).
236 Cf. State v. Kunz, 55 N.].128, 259 A.2d 895 (1969).
237 Legislatures could consider authorizing forms of non-incarceration other than pro.:
bation supervision, perhaps even to the extent ·of not applying state control in some
czes. In such cases, the criminal adjudication would be viewed as having served the
societal need for control.
·
·;
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fertse under the interest' analysis proposed. Legislative dissatisfaction with
rules of judicial disposition provides an opportunity for reexamination
of the substantive crime to insure that the conduct should be controlled
through the criminal law or has been properly classified by the judiciary
in the establishment of judicial dispositional policy.
, The aim of this article has been to develop alternatives to the doctrine
of judicial discretion in sentencing. What has been proposed is a new
mode of legal analysis, a model of criminal dispositions. As a method of
scholarship, the view of legal decision making advocated by this article
has three advantages. By illuminating the unique features of sentencing
as a legal decision, the model aids in determining what type of legal
principles are appropriate to achieve the law's purposes. Legal scholarship, with a better functional understanding of the legal rules of criminal
disposition, should be better able to use information and perspectives
from other disciplines. 238 Furthermore, the rules and principles recommended as alternatives under the model combine substance and procedure
since the doctrine of trial judge discretion represents a certain institutional resolution. The recommended realignment of institutional responsibility gives a prominent role to the appellate judiciary,239 while increas238 The influence of economic reasoning might be applied usefully to some problems
of criminal dispositions. See Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement,
1 J. LEGAL STUDIES 259 (1972). But such an integration of law and economics first assumes a £unctional understanding of law and legal rules as Professor Calabresi and Mr.
Melamed have demonstrated in their analysis of the variety of legal rules that might
be applied to the problem of pollution. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 43. Of particular interest is the authors' discussion of why the legal system needs criminal sanctions
to protect interests such as property interests when civil rules also protect those interests.
ld. at 1124-27. But see Frankel, Preventive Restraints and Just Compensation: Towards
a Sanction Law of the Future, 78 YALE L.J. 229, 256-67 (1968). Professor Frankel sug·
gests that a unitary view of the civil and penal systems of confinement should lead to
compensation to those involuntarily committed to mental institutions to protect the
public from deprivation of their liberty. Id. at 257. But if persons are compensated f.or
deprivations of liberty, would this lead to the extinction of what Professor Calabresi and
Mr. Melamed call ''property rules" and rules of "inalienability?"
Legal philosophy would appear to be of great relevance to a further study of sentencing. But until the broad school of legal philosophies allows the unique feature of. a
legal system, legal decision making, to enter its debates, the influence of legal philosophy
on sentencing will be small. Professor Graham Hughes, without specific references to
the problems of sentencing, has noted the failure of legal philosophers to examine the
nature of legal reasoning and decision making. See Hughes, Rules, Policy and DecisionMaking, 77 YALE L.J. 411, 439 n.22 (1968). A meaningful integration of legal philosophy
and judicial dispositional rules is beyond the scope of this article although certainly
worthy o£ further study. Mter all, Judge Frankel's characterization of the present practice of sentencing as "lawlessness" assumes we know what we mean by "law."
239 See United States v. Bradley, 93 S.Ct. 1151 (1973). This is one example of the interplay of legislative, judicial, and administrative functions in criminal dispositions. The
Court interpreted the effect of the saving clause of the new Federal Comprehensive Drug
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ing the responsibility of the legislative and administrative branches in
some areas. Finally, although the model of criminal dispositions is recommended as the alternative, the model does not solve all the important
questions of sentencing. Perhaps the model's greatest contribution as a
new mode of legal analysis is its ability to generate new questions and
define the perimeters of their resolution.

Prevention and Control Act of 1970 that would have eliminated the mandatory sentence
of incarceration in petitioner's case. The petitioner had been sentenced after the effective
date of the new act. However, the Court, in holding that petitioner was properly sentenced under the old act, reasoned that sentencing was part of the prosecution, the operative word of the saving clause o£ the new act. The Court left open the question of
whether the more stringent parole requirements of the old act would apply to the
petitioner's case, apparently on the theory that prosecution may not include the correctional process. Id. at 1156 n.6; see United States v. De Simone, 468 F.2d 1196 (2d Cir.
1972).

